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PRAGMATISM APPLIED: IMAGINING A
SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF
COURT CONGESTION
Michael L. Seigel'
I. INTRODUCTION
Somehow the unfortunate trend has arisen among attorneys to make
almost every case a BIG CASE. There is a tendency to want to
present the evidence not once, but many times over, and to adduce
needlessly cumulative evidence not only on the controverted issues
but also on those which are all but uncontested. Advocates tend to
confuse quantity of evidence with probative quality. Nothing lulls an
attorney to the passage of time like the sound of his or her own
voice. Few attorneys can tell you what time it is without describing
how the clock was made.'
"An antitrust suit remains a piece of litigation; it is not a life's
work."
2
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1. United States v. Reaves, 636 F. Supp. 1575, 1579 (E.D. Ky. 1986) (Bertelsman, J.).
2. SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 77 F.R.D. 10, 14 (D. Conn. 1977) (Newman, J.) (quot-
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The frustration of the judiciary is patent. As their per capita
caseloads have risen, judges have worked frantically to keep up. They
have become case managers,' shoving litigants through the system
with the constant refrain: hurry up and settle this case.4 They have
limited the time for trials, sometimes in mid-stream.5 They have set
up fora for forms of alternative dispute resolution ("ADR"), including
mediation,6 "early neutral evaluation, 7 and court-annexed arbitra-
tion.8 They have even created some innovative settlement techniques,
such as the Summary Jury Trial.9 Judges have done all this and
more, to no avail. The most recent statistics reveal that per capita
judicial caseloads are still on the rise," and the length of time be-
ing SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., No. 77-15807, slip op. at 4 (D. Conn. Oct. 31, 1975), order
denying SCM's motion to compel production of documents).
3. See Robert F. Peckham, A Judicial Response to the Cost of Litigation: Case Man-
agement, Two-Stage Discovery Planning and Alternative Dispute Resolution. 37 RUTGERS L.
REV. 253 (1985) (arguing in favor of judicial management of cases).
4. See id. at 267 ("The primary purpose of status and pretrial conferences is to plan
and structure the pretrial and trial stages of litigation . . . .Case management simply brings
cases to settlement or to trial sooner than if their progress were left entirely to the impetus
of the parties."); see also E. Donald Elliott, Managerial Judging and the Evolution of Pro-
cedure, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 306, 322-24 (1986) (contending that the goal of managerial judg-
ing quickly evolved from making litigation more efficient to settling cases). See generally
Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374 (1982) [hereinafter Resnik, Mana-
gerial Judges]. Judge Peckham takes issue with Professor Resnik's view (adopted in the text)
that judicial management of cases is primarily directed at promoting settlement. Peckham,
supra note 3, at 266-67.
5. See, e.g., SCM Corp., 77 F.R.D. at 11-12, 15 (ordering plaintiff, fourteen weeks
after the start of trial, to complete its case in six months).
6. See Peckham, supra note 3, at 274-77 (discussing the process of mediation).
7. See Wayne D. Brazil et al., Early Neutral Evaluation: An Experimental Effort to
Expedite Dispute Resolution, 69 JUDIcATUR 279 (1986) (describing the Northern District of
California's "early neutral evaluation" program); Irving R. Kaufman, Reform for a System in
Crisis: Alternative Dispute Resolution in the Federal Courts, 59 FORDHAM L. REv. 1, 12-13
(1990) (discussing early neutral evaluation).
8. See Kaufman, supra note 7, at 17-22 (describing court-annexed arbitration); Diane P.
Wood, Court-Annexed Arbitration: The Wrong Cure, 1990 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 421, 432-41
(describing the increasing use of arbitration in federal courts).
9. The Summary Jury Trial was designed by Judge Thomas Lambros. See Thomas D.
Lambros, The Summary Jury Trial and Other Alternative Methods of Dispute Resolution, 103
F.R.D. 461, 463 (1984).
10. In 1980, the number of civil cases pending in the federal courts per judgeship was
361. See 1990 Dig. ADMIN. OFF. U.S. Cms. ANN. REP. 7 (Table 5) [hereinafter 1990 RE-
PORT]. The same figure for 1990 was 421. Id. The number of cases filed in federal court,
however, has declined steadily since 1985. See id. (showing decline in commenced cases from
273,670 in 1985 to 217,879 in 1990). This decline has been the result of three factors: re-
ductions in the number of cases filed by the federal government to recover benefit
overpayments and defaulted student loans; reductions in the number of cases filed against the
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tween the filing of a civil lawsuit and its disposition is no shorter
today than it was ten years ago." It is therefore not surprising that
judges have, from time to time, simply lost their cool."
Legal scholars have long taken notice of the perceived problem
of court congestion; it has been an unending source of material for
scholarly inquiry. 3 The substance of scholars' reactions fall into sev-
federal government for benefits; and, in 1990, a reduction in the number of diversity cases
filed as a result of the increase in the jurisdictional amount from $10,000 to $50,000. See id
at 6-9.
11. The median disposition time for civil cases that went to trial in federal court in
1980 was 20 months. See 1980 DI. ADMIN. OFF. U.S. CTS. ANN. REP. 393 (Table C-5)
[hereinafter 1980 REPORT]. In 1990, the median disposition time was 19 months. See 1990
REPORT, supra note 10, at 157 (Table C-5).
Professor Priest has come to a similar conclusion regarding court congestion and the
general failure of reform measures to cure it. George L. Priest, Private Litigants and the
Court Congestion Problem, 69 B.U. L. REV. 527, 527 (1989) [hereinafter Priest, Private
Litigants].
12. The two remarks quoted at the outset of this Article are examples of statements
made by judges who were clearly exasperated by the length of the litigation they were super-
intending. See supra text accompanying notes 1-2. In another case, a federal district court
judge ordered a dismissal because, after he warned the parties that they needed to secure the
presence of enough witnesses to keep the case flowing, the plaintiff ran out of witnesses at
3:30 p.m. on the first day of trial. See Beary v. City of Rye, 601 F.2d 62, 64-65 (2d Cir.
1979) (describing events in the trial court). In the course of reversing the district court's
order, the Second Circuit stated: "This appeal is an example of a trial court's permitting its
zeal for clearing its calendar to overcome the right of a party to a full and fair trial on the
merits." l at 63.
13. See HANS ZEISEL Er AL., DELAY IN THE CoURT (1959); Albert W. Alschuler, Medi-
ation with a Mugger: The Shortage of Adjudicative Services and the Need for a Two-Tier
Trial System in Civil Cases, 99 HIv. L. REv. 1808 (1986); Marc Galanter, Reading the
Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know (and Think We Know) About Our
Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REv. 4 (1983) [hereinafter Galanter,
Landscape]; Kaufnan, supra note 7; Randy M. Mastro, The Myth of the Litigation Explosion,
60 FORDHAM L. REv. 199 (1991) (reviewing WALTER K. OLSON, THE LITIGATION EXPLO-
SION: WHAT HAPPENED WHEN AMERiCA UNLEASHED THE LAWSUIT (1991)); George L. Priest,
The Role of the Civil Jury in a System of Private Litigation, 1990 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 161
[hereinafter Priest, Role of the Jury]; Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in
Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 494 (1986) [hereinafter Resnik, Adjudicatory Decline]; Resnik,
Managerial Judges, supra note 4; Austin Sarat, The Litigation Explosion, Access to Justice,
and Court Reform: Examining the Critical Assumptions, 37 RUTGERS L. REV. 319 (1985);
Larry L. Sipes, Reducing Delay in State Courts-A March Against Folly, 37 RUTGERS L.
REv. 299 (1985).
The concern with court congestion has been the catalyst for the development of a new
field of legal scholarship focused on Alternative Dispute Resolution ("ADR"). Scholarly output
in this area has been tremendous. For example, a bibliography of American books and arti-
cles on the subject of dispute resolution for the two year period 1987-88 contains 1,608 en-
tries. CAROLE L. HiNCHCLIFF, DisPUTE RESOLtmON: A SELECTED BIHUOGRAPHY (1991). In
addition, at least two periodicals have been created to deal only with issues related to ADR,
the OHIo STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION published by the Bureau of National
19941
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eral distinct categories. Some have attempted to prove statistically that
the problem does not exist. 4 Others have touted ADR or modifica-
tions of the present civil trial system as presenting a way out. 5
Many have lamented the changes they believe to be the result of
overcrowded court dockets, such as managerial judging,16 the ever-
increasing use of ADR, 7 and the relentless push for settlement. 8
Although their differences are overwhelming, the vast majority of
the judges and scholars who have addressed the issue of court con-
gestion share one thing in common: the assumption that, when ADR
fails and settlement talks stall, the end result will be a "full-blown"
jury trial.' There is irony in this: on the one hand, the assumption
Affairs (BNA) and ALTERNATIVES TO THE HIGH CosT OF LITIGATION published by the Cen-
ter for Public Resources. See also sources cited infra notes 15, 17 & 113.
As noted elsewhere, evidence scholars have been conspicuously absent from the vast
scholarly dialogue concerning court congestion and ADR. See Michael L. Seigel, A Pragmatic
Critique of Modern Evidence Scholarship, 88 Nw. U. L. REv. 995 (1994); see infra text
accompanying notes 88-90.
14. See Galanter, Landscape, supra note 13, at 17-27, 30, 37-45; Sarat, supra note 13,
at 331-35.
15. See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 13, at 1845-54 (arguing for a two-tier trial system
for civil disputes); Deborah R. Hensler, Court-Ordered Arbitration: An Alternative View, 1990
U. CmII. LEGAL F, 399, 419-20 (concluding that court-annexed arbitration should be modified
but not eliminated); Richard McMillan, Jr. & David B. Siegel, Creating a Fast-Track Alterna-
tive Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 431 (1985);
Priest, Role of the Jury, supra note 13, at 191-99 (suggesting the use of bench trials for
routine civil cases); Leonard L. Riskin, The Special Place of Mediation in Alternative Dispute
Processing, 37 U. FLA. L. REV. 19 (1985).
16. See Alschuler, supra note 13, at 1832-36; Elliott, supra note 4, at 424-31. Although
Professor Elliott expresses his beliefs that managerial judging has made litigation more effi-
cient, id. at 315-16, and may even promote substantive justice in some kinds of cases, id. at
327-34, he concludes that "as a comprehensive strategy for dealing with the effects on inap-
propriate incentives in litigation, managerial judging is more stopgap than final solution." Id.
at 334.
17. See, e.g., Richard L. Marcus, Completing Equity's Conquest? Reflections on the
Future of Trial Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 50 U. Prrr. L. REv. 725 (1989)
(undertaking a comprehensive look at the alternatives and concluding that the civil jury trial
ought to be preserved as the primary mode of adjudication); Wood, supra note 8, at 451-55
(questioning whether court-annexed arbitration is achieving its goals and is worth its inherent
costs).
18. The classic statement on this point is Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE
LJ. 1073, 1073-75 (1984). See also Marc Galanter, " . . . A Settlement Judge, not a Trial
Judge:" Judicial Mediation in the United States, 12 J.L. & Soc'Y 1, 8-10 (1985) [hereinafter
Galanter, Judicial Mediation] (arguing that judges' increasing involvement in settlement nego-
tiations has not increased settlement rates).
19. In light of the fact that there is presently no such thing as a jury trial that is not
"full-blown," the frequent use of this term in ADR literature is quite interesting. Professor
Alschuler considers it a "disparaging modifier" and notes that "adjudication is not a dirty
word." Alschuler, supra note 13, at 1817.
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is based on the perception that a "full-blown" jury trial is the epitome
of justice; on the other hand, it is this very event that they are so
anxious to avoid. At any rate, despite the intense scrutiny legal actors
and commentators have given to the issue of court congestion in
recent years, few have taken a hard look at the jury trial itself.'
Can we improve the efficiency of jury trials? If so, would this reduce
the problem of court congestion? Is there any reason to favor this ap-
proach over those that seek to avoid jury trials altogether?
This Article attempts to answer these difficult questions. It does
so by articulating and then employing a methodology suggested by
recent scholarly ruminations about the philosophy of pragmatism and
its implications for legal scholarship and practice. Although pragma-
tism does not provide "right answers" to questions of legal doc-
trine-indeed, it rejects the notion that such things exist-it does
provide some guidance in formulating the search for workable solu-
tions to legal dilemmas. This is, however, a controversial proposition,
and so this Article begins with its defense.2 Once that task is ac-
complished, the Article will extrapolate some concrete methodological
tools from the tenets of pragmatism z' Finally, the Article will em-
ploy this methodology to argue for the development of an "Abbreviat-
ed Jury Trial" ("AJT").'3
Because a great deal of preliminary theory and analysis will be
undertaken before the AJT concept is fully developed, the reader is
entitled to a preview. The first step in designing a dispute resolution
technique is identifying the normative goals of an adjudicatory sys-
tem. This Article posits that these goals are: (1) efficiency; (2) just or
"accurate" results; (3) acceptable results; (4) public and on-the-record
20. This is not an accident. Those who would be most qualified to evaluate the effi-
ciency of the jury trial--evidence scholars-have been preoccupied by what I have identified
elsewhere as "foundational rationalism," the never-ending pursuit of "accurate" verdicts. See
Seigel, supra note 13, at 998-1001.
21. See infra part I.A.
22. See infra part ll.B. I note that the two parts of this Article-the discussion of legal
pragmatism and the proposal for the Abbreviated Jury Trial ("AJT")-are quite distinct. To a
large degree, each part stands on its own, and I invite readers who are interested in only one
or the other to limit their reading accordingly. There is, however, an important synergy that
results from presenting the two subjects as parts of a single work. The abstract methodologi-
cal insights derived from the philosophy of pragmatism come to life when they are employed
in making the case for an AJT, and the concrete project of designing the AJT is strength-
ened by being preceded by a discussion of the philosophical underpinnings of the methodolo-
gy employed.
23. See infra parts III and IV.
1994]
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proceedings; and (5) fact-finding by an impartial third party.' The
second step is assessing the need for an alternative process by exam-
ining the degree to which the current system-characterized by "full-
blown jury trials" at one end of the spectrum and private settlement
of cases at the other--consistently attains these goals. The results of
such an assessment come as no surprise. Jury trials do reasonably
well when measured by the yardsticks of accuracy, openness, and
impartiality, but they fail miserably against the yardstick of efficien-
cy." Settlement, on the other hand, is efficient, but it is conducted
and concluded in private, and it does not even purport to have an
adjudicatory component. Most traditional forms of ADR are simply
tools to produce settlement; even those that purport to do more, such
as binding arbitration, tend to sacrifice the goals of openness and
impartiality.26 The conclusion: something else is needed.
Thus arriveth the AJT. Appreciation of the AJT requires an
openness to the feasibility of something radically different from cur-
rent practice. First, to be worth the trouble, the AJT would have to
be considerably more efficient than current jury trials. This could be
accomplished only by uniting responsibility with power. Presently,
judges are responsible for moving their dockets along, but lawyers
retain most of the power over the pace of litigation. For efficient
results, the cost of delay must be placed on the lawyers. The AJT
would accomplish this task by being severely time-restricted. Early in
the pre-trial stage, the judge would set the length of each side's case.
These limits would then be strictly enforced. Each attorney would
bear the responsibility of tailoring her presentation to fit the time
allotted.27
For the time-limited AJT to be fair, trial procedures would re-
quire drastic alteration. Thus, in an AJT, each party's case would be,
in essence, a multi-media presentation by counsel, interspersing argu-
ment with evidence. Most of the evidence would consist of highlights
from videotaped depositions of various witnesses. The remaining
evidence would be tangible, such as documents and summaries. The
attorney would explain the evidence, and its significance, as she pre-
sented it to the jury. At the close of the plaintiffs presentation, the
defense would take its turn. Plaintiff would then have the opportunity
24. See infra text accompanying note 116.
25. See infra part Ill.C.1.
26. See infra part IL.C.4.
27. See infra text accompanying notes 137-40.
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to make a short rebuttal presentation, if necessary. After receiving in-
structions from the judge, the jury would retire for deliberations."
Some changes in pre-trial discovery would be required to accom-
modate AJTs. For example, the rules of civil procedure would require
amendment to provide for the routine videotaping of "trial deposi-
tions,"29 and to specify that the purpose of such depositions would
be to obtain direct and cross-examination excerpts for use at trial. The
most important amendment would be the requirement of an informa-
tion exchange several weeks before trial. Each party would be re-
quired to provide the other side with its "trial plan," and it would be
prohibited from deviating from this plan at trial. The exchange of
detailed trial information would protect the parties from surprise and
provide them with a means of combatting the presentation of false or
inaccurate information at trial. It would also ensure that the parties
engaged each other's main contentions in front of the jury.'
Obviously, special rules of evidence would govern AJTs. The
rule against hearsay would be altered to permit the introduction of
videotaped depositions without regard to the availability of the
declarants. The hearsay rule for AJTs would also permit attorneys to
proffer background information about witnesses and identify and
authenticate documents and tangible objects. In addition, rules regard-
ing relevancy would be abandoned, on the theory that lawyers under
severe time constraints would naturally choose their most relevant
evidence.3
Is the AJT feasible? Envisioning it requires a great deal of imag-
ination in order to overcome the cognitive imprint of our current trial
paradigm. The remainder of this Article attempts to justify such a
radical paradigm shift.
II. NEOPRAGMATISIM AND LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP
A. Legal Neopragmatism
In recent years, a number of philosophers32 and legal scholars33
28. See infra text accompanying notes 163-65.
29. These would be in addition to, or in lieu of, "discovery" depositions. See infra text
accompanying notes 153-58.
30. See infra text accompanying notes 169-71.
31. See infra text accompanying note 170.
32. The two contemporary philosophers who have had the greatest impact on legal
scholarship are Richard J. Bernstein and Richard Rorty. Their major works include: RICHARD
J. BERNSTEIN, BEYOND OBJECTVISM AND RELATIVIsM (1983); RIcHARD J. BERNSTEiN, PHmO-
1994]
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have revived an interest in the philosophy of pragmatism and have
explored its implications for legal scholarship and practice. These
"neopragmatists"' have employed their philosophy for two relatively
distinct purposes. Most often, they have used pragmatism as a tool to
describe the practice of law and legal scholarship. In this vein,
SOPHICAL PROFILES (1986); RICHARD RORTY, CONSEQUENCES OF PRAGMATISM (1982) [herein-
after RORTY, CONSEQUENCES]; RICHARD RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY AND SOLIDARITY
(1989) [hereinafter RORTY, CONTINGENCY]; RICHARD RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR
OF NATURE (1979); see also Thomas Morawetz, Understanding Disagreement, The Root Issue
of Jurisprudence: Applying Wittgenstein to Positivism, Critical Theory, and Judging, 141 U.
PA. L. REV. 371, 443 (1992) (attributing the revival of pragmatism to Rorty); Joseph W.
Singer, Should Lawyers Care About Philosophy?, 1989 DUKE LJ. 1752, 1754 (book review)
(same).
33. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THtE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 37-123 (1990) (ex-
plaining the contours of his pragmatic orientation to the law) [hereinafter POSNER, PROB-
LEMS]; PRAGMATISM IN LAW AND SoCIETY (Michael Brint & William Weaver eds., 1991);
Steven J. Burton, Law as Practical Reason, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 747 (1989) (setting forth a
philosophy of practical reason); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Inter-
pretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321 (1990) (using practical reason as a
tool in explicating the process of statutory interpretation); Daniel A. Farber, Legal Pragmatism
and the Constitution, 72 MINN. L. REv. 1331 (1988); Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey,
Practical Reason and the First Amendment, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1615 (1987) (attacking
foundationalism in First Amendment jurisprudence and suggesting instead the use of practical
reason); Thomas C. Grey, Hear the Other Side: Wallace Stevens and Pragmatist Legal Theo-
ry, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1569 (1990); Thomas C. Grey, Holmes and Legal Pragmatism, 41
STAN. L. REV. 787 (1989) [hereinafter Grey, Holmes and Pragmatism]; Richard A. Posner,
The Jurisprudence of Skepticism, 86 MICH. L. REV. 827 (1988) [hereinafter Posner, Skepti-
cism] (describing a skeptical outlook about law informed by pragmatism and practical reason);
Joseph W. Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE LJ. 1,
4-5 n.8 (1984) (describing his position as "irrationalism" but noting that "[a] better term
might be pragmatism"); Vincent A. Wellman, Practical Reasoning and Judicial Justification:
Toward An Adequate Theory, 57 COLO. L. REv. 45 (1985) (arguing that practically-based
means-ends rationality is an adequate method of legal justification).
34. The main roots of legal pragmatism can be traced to the philosophy of Charles
Peirce, William James, and John Dewey. See JOHN DEWEY, ESSAYS IN EXPERIMENTAL LOGIC
(Dover Publications 1953) (1916); JOHN DEWEY, EXPERiENCE AND NATURE (2d ed. 1958);
JOHN DEWEY, LOGIC: THE THEORY OF INQUIRY (1938); John Dewey, in MY PHILOSOPHY OF
LAW 71 (Julius Rosenthal Foundation, Northwestern University ed., 1987); JOHN DEWEY, THE
QUEST FOR CERTAINTY (1929); WILLIAM JAMES, PRAGMATISM AND FOUR ESSAYS FROM THE
MEANING OF TRUTH (Ralph B. Perry ed., World Book Publishing Co. 13th prtg. 1967)
(1909); 5 CHARLES S. PEIRCE, What Pragmatism Is, in COLLECTED PAPERS OF CHARLES
SANDERS PEIRCE 272 (Charles Hartshorne & Paul Weiss eds., Harvard Univ. Press 1960)
(1934). The modem pragmatists, to whom I have attached the label "neopragmatists," differ
from their predecessors primarily in their rejection of logical positivism, that is, the belief
that the scientific method has a special claim to the generation of "truth." See Richard Rorty,
The Banality of Pragmatism and the Poetry of Justice, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1811, 1813
(1990) [hereinafter Rorty, Banality of Pragmatism]; see also Grey, Holmes and Pragmatism,
supra note 33, at 789-91 (noting that neopragmatists reject the logical positivist orientation of
their predecessors).
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neopragmatic scholars have criticized what they see as the last vestig-
es of Langdellian formalism in legal thought." At the same time,
they have criticized the nihilism of the school of jurisprudence known
as Critical Legal Studies ("CLS"). 6 On occasion, however, some
neopragmatists have also attempted to spell out various programmatic
implications of their philosophy.37 These attempts have drawn fire,
even from some who identify themselves as pragmatic."
The basic principles of legal neopragmatism have been described
in detail elsewhere39 and need only be summarized here. The funda-
mental teachings of neopragmatism are (1) antifoundationalism; (2)
the inescapability of subjectivity;4' (3) the existence and validity of
rational methods of decision-making, collectively termed "practical
reason," apart from the scientific methodologies of empiricism and
deductive logic; and (4) instrumentalism. In the context of legal inqui-
ry, antifoundationalism is the belief that one cannot base any signifi-
cant area of legal doctrine upon a single dominant value or grand
theory; rather, difficult legal decisions are inevitably the result of a
complex mix of empirical and normative judgments. A foundationalist
theory, such as "the purpose of evidence doctrine is to maximize the
accuracy of trial verdicts," simultaneously proves too little and too
much. In other words, if the theory were followed to the letter, some
specific outcomes would be patently absurd. On the other hand, as to
some issues the foundationalist principle is indeterminate; the princi-
ple plus deductive logic fails to produce a definitive answer regarding
the optimal configuration of doctrine or outcome of a case.4'
35. The type of formalism attacked by neopragmatists has been termed
"foundationalism." See Grey, Holmes and Pragmatism, supra note 33, at 799; see also infra
text accompanying note 41.
36. See, e.g., John Stick, Can Nihilism Be Pragmatic?, 100 HARV. L. REV. 332, 332-33
(1986).
37. See Stanley Fish, Almost Pragmatism: The Jurisprudence of Richard Posner, Richard
Rorty, and Ronald Dworkin, in PRAGMATISM iN LAW AND SoCIETY 47-57 (Michael Brint &
William Weaver eds., 1991) (distinguishing the pragmatist account of how the law works
from pragmatic programs-which "ask[] the question 'what follows from the pragmatist ac-
count?'); see also infra text accompanying notes 53-65.
38. See infra text accompanying notes 66-74.
39. One of the most thorough and thoughtful explications of neopragmatism can be
found in Grey, Holmes and Pragmatism, supra note 33, at 793-815; see also Seigel, supra
note 13, at 1025-45.
40. This neopragmatist belief is also called contextualism. See Grey, Holmes and Prag-
matism, supra note 33, at 799.
41. See Seigel, supra note 13, at 1009-25; see also Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 33,
at 324-25; Farber & Frickey, supra note 33, at 1618-27.
1994]
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The second tenet of neopragmatism follows from the first. The
non-existence of metaphysical first principles means that all judgments
about legal doctrine are necessarily personal and subjective. In every
imaginable situation, a legal decision-maker (or a scholar recommend-
ing doctrinal change) must pick and choose from a multitude of em-
pirical and normative possibilities. There is no objective escape-route;
indeed, the choice to appeal to an objective basis for a decision is
itself a subjective determination. In addition, the so-called objective
basis for many decisions turns out to be foundational, meaning that
avoidance of its absurdity or indeterminacy requires making implicit
and unarticulated subjective judgments.42
The neopragmatist does not take from these insights a message
of nihilism or despair. 3 Instead, the third main tenet of pragmatism
holds that, despite the lack of foundations, legal actors make "ratio-
nal" decisions all the time." They do so by employing the methods
of practical reason, which include "anecdote, introspection, imagina-
tion, common sense, intuition .... empathy, imputation of motives,
speaker's authority, metaphor, analogy, precedent, custom, memo-
ry, ... [and] 'experience.'"" To the extent that a particular decision
commands a consensus among interested observers, it can appropriate-
ly be labeled "correct" or "just." Nevertheless, neopragmatists contend
that the set of "correct" or "just" outcomes is subject to change over
time. This occurs through a process of conversation or dialogue
among members of the interested community.'
Finally, neopragmatists generally agree that the value of legal
doctrine is essentially instrumental; what is "right" or "good" is what
works. Neopragmatists insist "that propositions be tested by their
consequences, by the difference they make-and if they make none,
42. See Seigel, supra note 13, at 1021-22, 1026-29.
43. See Allan C. Hutchinson, The Three 'Rs': ReadingRorty/Radically, 103 HARV. L.
Rnv. 555, 560 n.15 (1989) (reviewing RiCHAMR RORTY, CoNTMoENcy, IRONY, AD Sou-
DARITY (1989)) (noting that "Rorty's non-foundationalism rejects nihilism or relativism as
much as absolutism").
44. See Steven J. Burton, Judge Posner's Jurisprudence of Skepticism, 87 MICH. L.
REv. 710, 714-16 (1988).
45. Posner, Skepticism, supra note 33, at 838. Professor Rorty states that neopragmatism
means "freedom from anxiety about one's scientificity."1 Rorty, Banality of Pragmatism, supra
note 34, at 1815.
46. As Rorty has said: "A liberal society is one which is content to call 'true' (or
'right' or 'just') whatever the outcome of undistorted communication happens to be, whatever
view wins in a free and open encounter." RORTY, CONTINGENCY, supra note 32, at 67; see
also Seigel, supra note 13, at 1028-29.
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set aside."'47 Because foundationalist principles are eternally elusive,
neopragmatists believe that legal decisions ought to be judged by
their actual effects on real people, not by their conformity with ab-
stract concepts or their contribution to theoretical elegance. As Profes-
sor Grey has eloquently stated, "[p]ragmatism is freedom from theory-
guilt. 4
8
Neopragmatist thought has attracted its share of critics. Some
scholars-such as those associated with CLS-have argued that
neopragmatism is nothing more than a lame defense of the status
quo.49 Others have argued that neopragmatism inevitably slides into
pure relativism;'a they contend that practical reason is contentless,51
47. Richard A. Posner, What Has Pragmatism to Offer Law?, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 1653,
1660 (1990) [hereinafter Posner, Pragmatism?]. William James has stated that the pragmatic
method means "[t]he attitude of looking away from first things, principles, 'categories,' sup-
posed necessities; and of looking towards last things, fruits, consequences, facts." JAMES,
supra note 34, at 47.
48. Thomas C. Grey, Hear the Other Side: Wallace Stevens and Pragmatist Legal Theo.
ry, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1569, 1569 (1990); see also Rorty, Banality of Pragmatism, supra
note 34, at 1819 ("I agree with Grey when he says: 'Pragmatism rejects the maxim that you
can only beat a theory with a better theory. . . . No rational God guarantees in advance
that important areas of practical activity will be governed by elegant theories."').
Professor Grey points out, however, that pragmatism-at least in its Deweyan
strand-is not purely instrumental: activities, no matter how "instrumentally conceived, are to
be evaluated by their intrinsic satisfactions or frustrations as well as by their consequences."
Grey, Holmes and Pragmatism, supra note 33, at 854-55.
49. See Jay M. Feinman, Practical Legal Studies and Critical Legal Studies, 87 MICH.
L. REV. 724, 731 (1988); Hutchinson, supra note 43, at 565-69 (criticizing Rorty for espous-
ing "liberal complacency' rather than "radical optimism"); Edward L. Rubin, The Practice
and Discourse of Legal Scholarship, 86 MICH. L. REv. 1835, 1878 (1988) ("Politically, the
practical reason movement is . . . at least incrementalist, if not directly supportive of the
status quo.").
50. See Alan Bloom, THE CLOSING OF THm AMERICAN MIND (1987); Michael S. Moore,
A Natural Law Theory of Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 277 (1985).
51. See Nancy Levit, Practically Unreasonable: A Critique of Practical Reason, 85 Nw.
U. L. REV. 494, 496 (1991) (reviewing RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRU-
DENCE (1990)) (describing Posner's version of practical reason as scientifically unreasonable
because it classifies common sense as good judgment and "relies on untutored and nonreflec-
tive techniques of reasoning"); Martin H. Redish & Gary Lippman, Freedom of Expression
and the Civic Republican Revival in Constitutional Theory: The Ominous Implications, 79
CAL. L. REv. 267, 290 n.132 (1991) (noting that practical reason assumes that there are
sensible answers to issues that should be universally acknowledged without the benefit of
logical argument); Steven D. Smith, The Pursuit of Pragmatism, 100 YALE LJ. 409, 434-37
(1990) (arguing that the pragmatist appeal to intuition, dialogue, and contextualism does not
amount to a coherent method of decision-making).
At least one neopragmatist has responded to this criticism by attempting to identify
with more sophistication the content of practical reason. See Daniel A. Farber, The Inevitabili-
ty of Practical Reason: Statutes, Formalism, and the Rule of Law, 45 VAND. L. REV. 533,
554-59 (1992) (examining the findings of scientists working in the field of artificial intelli-
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and that consensus is an empty and potentially dangerous measure-
ment of justice and truth. 2
Undaunted by such criticism, some neopragmatists have gone
even further. They have attempted to set forth, in varying degrees of
detail, programmatic implications of neopragmatist thought. The
neopragmatist programs fall into two distinct categories: (1) pragmatic
prophesies; and (2) pragmatic attitudes and methodologies. 3 The first
category consists of agendas for social change articulated by various
pragmatists.' The substantive content of any particular strand of pro-
gence that indicate the existence of a sophisticated cognitive ability to recognize patterns
which could be part of practical reasoning).
52. See, e.g., Singer, supra note 32, at 1763 (arguing that Rorty's version of pragma-
tism, which "identifies truth with whatever beliefs become dominant in our society ...
identifie[s] reason with the status quo. This is because his description of politics leaves no
room for subcomnmunities or for disagreements within the dominant culture about social jus-
tice.").
53. See generally Seigel, supra note 13. For my purposes, attitudes and methods can be
lumped together because they are different degrees of the same phenomenon. One's attitude
toward a problem contributes to the manner in which one sets out to address it. The manner
in which one addresses a problem, to the extent consciously systematized, is one's methodol-
ogy.
54. Rorty, Banality of Pragmatism, supra note 34, at 1815. See Comel West, The Limits
of Neopragmatism, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 1747, 1750 (1990). Readers should note that I use
the term prophetic pragmatism as it is employed by Rorty rather than West. West's view of
prophetic pragmatism is, under Rorty's implicit (and my explicit) definition, impure; it meshes
together a vision of social organization and change with a particular view of pragmatic meth-
odology:
Prophetic pragmatism gives courageous resistance and relentless critique a self-criti-
cal character and democratic content; that is, it analyzes the social causes of un-
necessary forms of social misery, promotes moral outrage against them, organizes
different constituencies to alleviate them, yet does so with an openness to its own
blindnesses and shortcomings.
Id. at 1750. Rorty, on the other hand, identifies prophetic pragmatism as "a visionary tradi-
tion to which, as it happened, a few philosophy professors once made particularly important
contributions." Rorty, Banality of Pragmatism, supra note 34, at 1819. He specifically cites
the "left-looking social prophecies" of John Dewey as an (admirable) example of prophetic
pragmatism. Id. at 1815-16.
Rorty himself has engaged in prophetic pragmatism. RORTY, CONTINGENCY, supra note
32, at 3-22; see also Lynn A. Baker, "Just Do It": Pragmatism and Progressive Social
Change, in PRAoMATISM IN LAW & SOCIETY 100-05 (Michael Brint & William Weaver eds.,
1991); Hutchinson, supra note 43, at 560-69 (discussing Rorty's political theorizing). As
Baker summarizes it, Rorty's prophecies consist of "three interrelated hopes: that suffering
and cruelty will be diminished; that freedom will be maximized; and that 'chances for fulfill-
ment of idiosyncratic fantasies will be equalized."' Baker, supra, at 100 (footnotes omitted).
Baker also identifies what she calls a "processual strand" of Rorty's prophetic pragmatism. d
According to Rorty, pragmatism in all but its prophetic version is by now banal.
Rorty, Banality of Pragmatism, supra note 34, at 1813; see also id. at 1819 (stating that
"pragmatism's philosophical force [has been] pretty well exhausted"). I disagree with this
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phetic pragmatism is not itself pragmatic-as most neopragmatists are
quick to point out. This is as it must be: if a pragmatist held out any
particular vision of society as the "right" one, he would, of course, be
committing a blatant violation of pragmatism's principle of
antifoundationalism'
Neopragmatists have also attempted to draw attitudinal or meth-
odological implications from their philosophical insights. Cornel West,
for example, has identified what he calls the "critical temper" that
flows from pragmatic philosophy. "The critical temper promotes a
full-fledged experimental disposition that highlights the provisional,
tentative, and revisable character of our visions, analyses, and ac-
tions."56 Similarly, Joseph Singer argues that acceptance of pragma-
tism should lead to "thinking about truth and justice as essentially
contested concepts."'57 According to Singer, we should "build conflict
and a questioning attitude into our reasoning process itself[,
which] .. .requires a sense of distance from one's own preconcep-
tions, a questioning, skeptical attitude toward inherited values and
institutions, and a willingness to learn from others with different
perspectives."" In a significantly more conservative vein, Daniel
Farber has contended that pragmatism helps us realize that some legal
problems are quite difficult, requiring "all of our intelligence and
creativity to devise an acceptable solution." '59 He argues that pragma-
tism encourages "incremental decisionmaking rather than global reme-
dies" and, although not strictly utilitarian, "it does prompt a healthy
concern about the societal impact of law."'
Perhaps the most ambitious attempt to draw methodological
implications for legal scholarship from pragmatism (and other philo-
sophical schools sharing common themes) has been carried out by
Edward Rubin.6 Rubin asserts that legal scholarship should "explore
position, at least to the extent that I believe that pragmatism has a role to play in shaping
the methodology of legal scholarship. See infra text accompanying notes 75-87.
55. Rorty, Banality of Pragmatism, supra note 34, at 1816-19; cf. Baker, supra note 54,
at 103-06 (noting that Rorty makes his proposals for progressive social change not as an
antifoundationalist but as a prophet).
56. West, supra note 54, at 1751. As noted above, West does not separate out this
methodological or attitudinal component from other elements of what he labels prophetic
pragmatism. See supra note 54.
57. Singer, supra note 32, at 1763.
58. ld.
59. Farber, supra note 33, at 1342.
60. Id. at 1343.
61. Rubin, supra note 49. Rubin delineates what he labels "the critique of methodolo-
19941
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW
and contrast the pragmatic implications of conflicting normative posi-
tions."'62 Scholars' discourse ought to consist of "prescriptive argu-
ments based on consciously acknowledged normative positions."'63 He
counsels legal scholars to be more "self-aware," contending that self-
awareness would enable them to recognize that doctrinal arguments
do not dictate social norms, but are simply "discursive strategies" for
implementing them.' Rubin also argues that additional self-aware-
ness would permit legal scholars to make more extensive but con-
trolled use of empirical data.'
The various attempts by scholars to extrapolate methodological
ramifications from the philosophy of pragmatism have drawn some
severe criticism. For example, Stanley Fish-who claims to possess a
"deeply pragmatist view of the law"--has written:
[O]nce pragmatism becomes a program it turns into the essentialism
it challenges; as an account of contingency and of agreements that
are conversationally not ontologically based, it cannot without con-
tradiction offer itself as a new and better basis for doing busi-
ness .... [A]wareness of contingency allows one neither to master
it (as if knowledge of an inescapable condition enabled you to es-
cape it) nor to be better at it (a quite incoherent notion) .... [I]f
you take the antifoundationalism of pragmatism seriously ... you
will see that there is absolutely nothing you can do with it.67
To illustrate his point, Fish discerns from Rorty's writings an injunc-
gy," which he defines as the common theme that can be found in a wide variety of twenti-
eth-century philosophical thought. Id at 1835-37. In addition to the teachings of the Ameri-
can pragmatists and neopragmatists, Rubin includes within the scope of his analysis
the phenomenology of Husserl, Schutz, and Merleau-Ponty, the linguistic analysis
of the later Wittgenstein, followed by Peter Winch, A.R. Louch, and, in some
sense Thomas Kuhn, the hermeneutics of Heidegger, Ricoeur, and Gadamer, the
critical theory of the Frankfurt School and Habermas and, to some extent, the
poststructuralism of Foucault and Derrida.
Id. at 1835-36 (footnotes omitted).
Rubin claims that the essential problem with legal scholarship is its "unity of dis-
course" with lawyers and judges. Id. at 1881. His prescriptions for better scholarship follow
from this insight. See id. at 1880-91.
62. Id at 1893.
63. Id
64. Id at 1895-96. Rubin suggests that such self-awareness would enable legal scholars
to compare the probable success of altering the law through doctrinal argument with other
methods of achieving legal change, such as legislation or administrative regulation. Id at
1895-97.
65. Id at 1896-97.
66. Fish, supra note 37, at 55.
67. Id. at 63.
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tion to sharpen the "pragmatist skill" of "imaginative identification,"
that is, the "'ability to envisage, and desire to prevent, the actual and
possible humiliation of others."'" Fish translates this skill into the
attitude of "tolerance" and argues that "expansions of sympathy[]
cannot be planned, and cannot be planned for by developing a special
empathetic muscle .... ITolerance ... is not a separate ability, a
virtue with its own context-independent shape, but is rather a way of
relating or attending whose shape depends on commitments one al-
ready feels."' In other words, as Fish sees it, a blanket injunction to
be tolerant is a foundational principle that, as such, is in conflict with
pragmatism's antifoundationalism and is meaningless without context.
Lynne Baker has also questioned whether pragmatism is useful in
the achievement of progressive social change.70 She notes that the
widespread acceptance of pragmatism could "yield a more 'revisable'
culture[,]" but warns that "'revisability' alone does not increase the
likelihood that any changes that occur in the society will be in the
direction of progress."7' In addition, Baker points out, a prophet'
who lays claim to metaphysical notions such as truth or God might
be more successful in motivating others to attempt change than the
pragmatist who promises only a contingent vision of a new world.'
Finally, Baker discounts the usefulness of antifoundationalism to the
personal motivation of a prophet:
But is it really useful to prophets to conceptualize their own
vision, the societal change they advocate, as being part of a larger,
endless evolutionary process? Not necessarily .... [Ain
antifoundationalist conception of social change as evolution may
dilute both the prophet's belief in his own vision and his motivation
to effect social change. It is one thing to believe ... that the status
quo is neither necessary nor the best possible state of affairs; but
68. Md. at 64 (quoting RORTY, CONTiNGENCY, supra note 32, at 93).
69. Id. at 65-66.
70. Although she does not explicitly identify herself as a neopragmatist, Baker's prag-
matic orientation is clear. First, her comment on Rorty's philosophy is generally very favor-
able. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 54, at 107 (reinterpreting Rorty's claim to limited prophetic
imagination to mean that "more accurately, Rorty's quite substantial prophetic imagination
simply does not extend this far"). Second, she evaluates Rorty's claims for a postmetaphysical
culture on "Rorty's own pragmatist terms." Id. at 108.
71. Id. at 110.
72. Baker defines a "prophet" as "an interpreter or leader with a vision of a better
world." Id at 103. Although more modest than what Baker may have in mind, I think it is
fair to include within the term "prophet' scholars who argue for changes in existing legal
doctrine.
73. Id at 110-11.
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quite another to believe that the better world one envisions and
would work toward achieving is also a contingency, a mere resting
point in a larger evolution.74
At least in the context of legal scholarship, both Fish and Baker
are wrong, though the reasons for this are as different as their posi-
tions. First, Fish's claim that methodologies, such as the use of imag-
inative identification, are meaningless without context does not with-
stand scrutiny. Although it is true that the same person will approach
different situations with varying degrees of empathy, the "baseline"
level of empathy that different people employ in approaching all
problems is also subject to variation. Can there be any doubt that
some people are, in general, better listeners and care-takers than oth-
ers? In Fish's terms, such people possess a better developed "empa-
thetic muscle" than those who might be characterized as cold-hearted
or self-involved. Moreover, rhetoric-generated from within or re-
ceived from without-can have a profound effect on an individual's
overall level of tolerance. If internally motivated, individuals can con-
sciously work at being better listeners, at taking the time to imagine
themselves in the shoes of those whose views they do not initially
understand or with which they initially disagree. They can also be
convinced by the rhetoric of others. If this were not so, how could
one explain the inspiration to action fueled by the great rhetoricians
in history, such as Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.? Fish's contention that
people change their minds essentially at random, and not as a result
of reflection or rhetoric, simply does not comport with reality."
Note, however, that empathy or tolerance is only consistent with
pragmatism when viewed as an attitude or methodology, not as an
ultimate or absolute principle. There are undoubtedly some positions
with regard to which tolerance would be an unfortunate response.
Racism is one example. This fact, though, is not in conflict with the
general pragmatic exhortation that individuals should strive to start
conversations from a position of tolerance and empathy, even if they
ultimately reject an opposing point of view. For the pragmatist, the
important thing is that raising one's overall level of empathy will
74. Id. at 113. Baker concludes that "antifoundationalism might [only] be useful to
especially intellectual prophets who need to extricate themselves from philosophical or theoret-
ical hassles." Id. at 114.
75. This latter criticism of Fish's position has been made by E.D. Hirsch, Jr. See E.D.
Hirsch, Jr., Comment on Paper by Stanley Fish, in PRAGMATISM IN LAW & SocIETY 85-87
(Michael Brint & William Weaver eds., 1991).
[Vol. 22:567
PRAGMATISM APPLIED
probably be of help in formulating and carrying out a plan of social
change. In the case of racists, it is undoubtedly better to try to un-
derstand their view of the world before attempting to persuade them
to modify it.
Baker's critique of the value of neopragmatic insights to the
achievement of social change is probably applicable in some contexts,
but it does not seem germane to legal scholarship.76 Through devices
such as stare decisis and cannons of statutory interpretation, law plac-
es great weight on the past and has a built-in affinity for the status
quo. As a result, stasis is a strong and undeniable part of legal cul-
ture. For instance, judges who strike out in new directions are pejora-
tively labeled "activist." Furthermore, ancient legal terms, such as
"malice aforethought" and "premeditation" in the law of homicide,
remain part of the common law and are incorporated into "modem"
codifications, even though they are effectively contentless.' In law
school, it is not uncommon to teach doctrine and method through the
use of cases that are decades if not centuries old.7"
Given this state of affairs, the pragmatic realization that all hu-
man decisions are contingent-including those labeled "legal"--results
not in demoralization and paralysis, as Baker fears, but in a sense of
liberation and empowerment.79 The deep-seated conviction that our
76. In Baker's defense, it is pretty clear that she has something more grandiose than
legal scholarship in mind when she discusses whether antifoundationalism would assist a
prophet in achieving social change. Specifically, she has under consideration the two kinds of
prophets emphasized in Rorty's writings: authors of narratives and leaders of separatist
groups. See Baker, supra note 54, at 111-15.
77. For example, the California Penal Code, which is in large part a faithful codification
of the old common law of homicide, defines murder as "the unlawful killing of a human be-
ing . . . with malice aforethought." CAL. PENAL CODE § 187(a) (West 1988). It turns out,
however, that the requirement of "malice aforethought" dictates proof of neither malice nor
forethought. Rather, it has come to mean homicide when there is a deliberate intention to
take a life, "when no considerable provocation appears" or when committed with "an aban-
doned and malignant heart." CAL. PENAL CODE § 188 (West 1988). Similarly, in Pennsylva-
nia, the premeditation necessary for first degree murder can occur in an instant; in reality,
legal "premeditation" requires no premeditation at all. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Carrol, 194
A.2d 911 (Pa. 1963).
78. For example, the seminal case in criminal law on a number of issues, including
justification and excuse, is Regina v. Dudley and Stephens, 14 Q.B.D. 273 (1884).
79. In making this broad claim, I am influenced by my own sense of liberation when,
during my first year of law school, I became convinced that, as to their deconstruction of
legal doctrine (what Rubin would call their "critique of methodology"), my CLS profes-
sors-such as Gerald Frog and Duncan Kennedy-were right. Not surprisingly, my reaction is
the one anticipated by Rorty. As Professor Hutchinson notes,
Rorty seeks to nurture a stronger sense of historical contingency so as to empower
people rather than to cow them by the understanding that there are no antecedent
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culture is "revisable," that nothing has to be the way it is, can help a
legal scholar push forward against the law's considerable inertia.
Furthermore, recognition of the fact that any sought-after goal is itself
contingent does not, as Baker predicts, dampen the spirit of one seek-
ing social change through law. The "even better" social arrangement
is, by definition, unimagined (and probably unimaginable). Its mere
theoretical existence is a very weak source of despair. In short, con-
trary to Baker's view, antifoundationalism seems to be a useful frame
of mind for those who endeavor to change society through legal
scholarship.
The same is true for pragmatism's antimetaphysical stance. Baker
is perhaps correct that appeals to metaphysical entities might help a
prophet achieve social change-when the appeals are to a non-prag-
matic mass audience.' But in the context of legal scholarship, it
seems farfetched to believe that the mere invocation of God, truth, or
reason would cause others to accept the legitimacy of one's social
vision. Rather, legal scholars are certain to look beyond metaphysical
claims and assess the "cash value" of another scholar's position. On
the other hand, one particular metaphysical notion--"The Law"-acts
as a brake on the development of forward-looking legal scholarship.
Despite the successes of legal realism, CLS, and legal pragmatism,
much contemporary legal scholarship still purports to examine what
"The Law" requires in a given context rather than undertake an ex-
amination of what the law ought to require to achieve stated social
goals. Self-conscious recognition that "The Law" does not exist ex-
truths or essential scripts to follow. By recognizing past truths as merely old con-
tingencies, people can "get out from under inherited contingencies and make [their]
own contingencies."
Hutchinson, supra note 43, at 559 (quoting RORTY, CONTINGENCY, supra note 32, at 97)
(alteration in original).
80. Rorty, however, anticipates this argument and rejects it outright:
[The argument in question] amounts to the prediction that the prevalence of ironist
notions among the public at large, the general adoption of antimetaphysical,
antiessentialist views about the nature of morality and the rationality of human
beings, would weaken and dissolve liberal societies. It is possible that this predic-
tion is correct, but there is at least one excellent reason for thinking it false. This
is the analogy with the decline of religious faith. That decline, and specifically the
decline of people's ability to take the idea of postmortem rewards seriously, has
not weakened liberal societies, and indeed has strengthened them . . . As it
turned out, ...willingness to endure suffering for the sake of future reward was
transferable from individual rewards to social ones, from one's hopes for paradise
to one's hopes for one's grandchildren.
RORTY, CONInNGENCY, supra note 32, at 85 (footnote omitted).
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cept as a contingent human construct would probably help legal
scholars achieve and maintain an explicitly normative discourse.
Though there may be good reasons for lawyers and judges to worry
about what the law is, legal scholarship is most valuable as an enter-
prise directed at deliberating over what the law ought to be.8"
Having outlined the contours of neopragmatism and defended the
proposition that it can yield useful insights into the methodology of
legal scholarship without being internally inconsistent, the next step is
to give specific content to the pragmatic methodology that will be
employed in this Article. That task is taken up in the next section.
B. Neopragmatic Methodology for Legal Scholarship
The methodological ramifications of legal neopragmatism follow
directly from its teachings. To begin with, the spirit of
antifoundationalism counsels scholars against devoting their time to
extensive debates over the validity of first principles and favors that
they direct their professional energies toward the solving of real social
and legal problems. This prescription should not be interpreted to bar
neopragmatists from participating in purely intellectual inquiries or
theoretical debates, for these endeavors are of obvious value to the
improvement of the human condition. It suggests, however, that
scholars' discourse ought to focus on two projects: (1) articulating
and justifying the (often conflicting) normative goals that legal doc-
trine ought to pursue, and (2) identifying the best methods for the
achievement of these goals. In order to accomplish the former project,
scholars need to be very explicit in identifying the normative posi-
tions, or values, that underlie their work."2 The latter project may be
81. Cf. Rubin, supra note 49, at 1904-05 (urging that scholars develop a "distinctive
voice" and "independent research agenda" apart from legal decision-makers such as judges,
legislators, and administrators to contribute in a relevant way to legal scholarship).
82. I thus explicitly reject the notion put forward by some CLS scholars that
normativity is an evil that ought to be avoided in legal scholarship. See, e.g., Richard
Delgado, Norms and Normal Science: Toward a Critique of Normativity in Legal Thought,
139 U. PA. L. REV. 933 (1991); Pierre Schlag, Normativity and the Politics of Form, 139 U.
PA. L. REV. 801 (1991). In my view, the fundamental problem with protests against norma-
tive legal scholarship is that they ignore the inherent normativity of non-academic legal dis-
course. Legislatures and judges do not have the luxury of disregarding the normative ques-
tion: what should the law be? They must answer this question with or without the assistance
of legal scholars. A categorical anti-normativist position thus must rest upon one or more of
the following premises: (1) legal scholars have "more important" work to do than assist judg-
es and legislatures in determining what the law ought to be; (2) legal scholarship has no
effect on the shape of the law because judges and legislatures do not pay attention to it; (3)
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accomplished through the use of appropriate techniques of practical
reason, such as analogy and anecdote, or, when appropriate, through a
carefully planned and patient course of social scientific research. 3
Scholars should also take from antifoundationalism an attitude of
skepticism toward global or grandiose solutions to legal problems
abstracted from real world concerns. Instead, scholars ought to be
prepared to examine relevant real world situations in detail and to
keep in mind that different contexts might require different problem-
solving strategies. 4 What is right for one kind of legal dispute might
not be right for another; what works in one part of the country, or in
one administrative agency, might not work in another. The legal
scholar who ignores differences for the purpose of simplification
might end up with an elegant theory, but he will fail the
pragmatism's instrumental test of proposing something that will, in
fact, work. Like all human endeavors, academic pursuits should be
measured "by their consequences, by the difference they make-and if
they make none, [they should be] set aside."'
Additionally, pragmatism reminds us of the inescapability of
subjectivity. In accordance with this precept, legal scholars ought to
be very explicit about their subjective orientation to the problems that
they seek to address. In some cases, this might necessitate that the
scholar set forth narratives of her personal experiences, and perhaps
the experiences of others, that are relevant to her views. Self-con-
scious examination of subjectivity cannot, of course, overcome it,'
but it can increase one's sensitivity to the fact that convictions are
judges and legislatures would do a better job of determining the shape of legal doctrine if
left to their own devices; or (4) it does not matter what "the law" is, because legal outcomes
are based on things other than legal doctrine, such as relationships of power.
Although each of these propositions is partially true, none is categorically so. This
counsels only that legal scholars examine their scholastic choices critically and self-conscious-
ly, not that they abandon normative scholarship altogether. See generally Margaret J. Radin &
Frank Michelman, Pragmatist and Poststructuralist Critical Legal Practice, 139 U. PA. L.
REv. 1019 (1991).
83. I note that this general prescription for legal scholarship is in accord with that put
forward by Professor Rubin. See supra text accompanying notes 61-65. 1 also note that on a
previous occasion I have warned about the misuses of empirical research in legal scholarship.
See Seigel, supra note 13, at 1043-44.
84. As Hutchinson points out, the pragmatic requirement of situated decision-making is
not met simply by immersion in the relevant doctrinal tradition; rather, it requires paying
attention to "the actual social context in which disputes arise [and] to the political conse-
quences of decisions." Hutchinson, supra note 43, at 576-77.
85, Posner, Pragmatism?, supra note 47, at 1660.
86. Fish is quite right that the idea is incoherent. See supra text accompanying note 67.
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shaped-and perhaps skewed-by experience. In addition, a frank
account of the circumstances contributing to a scholar's vision pro-
vides other participants in an academic dialogue the opportunity for
more effective evaluation of that vision."
Neopragmatism also emphasizes the contingent nature of social
arrangements. This should not only encourage scholars to challenge
the status quo, it should also cause them to recognize that better
social arrangements are most likely to be developed over time and
through a process of trial and error. Thus, neopragmatist scholars
ought to be comfortable suggesting that their visions of social and
legal change be implemented on an experimental basis, and that these
changes be evaluated over some explicit period of time. In addition,
whenever possible, scholars ought to recommend concrete ways
through which the success of their proposals can be measured. Ideal-
ly, authors ought to follow-up their initial scholarship by reporting on
the results of any experimental implementation of their recommen-
dations.
With all this in mind, it is time to turn our attention to the
problem of court delay in civil cases.
III. APPLYING NEOPRAGMATIC METHODOLOGY TO THE PROBLEM OF
COURT CONGESTION
A. Statement of Personal Perspective
In accordance with the neopragmatic methodology outlined
above, this section represents an attempt to provide readers with my
subjective orientation to the issue of civil litigation delay. I first be-
came interested in the problem of civil litigation delay when I was
doing research for an earlier article critiquing modem evidence schol-
87. Scholars should also respond to the inescapability of subjectivity by attempting to
transcend the narrowness of their own point of view through empathetic listening. They
should exercise their "empathetic muscle." See supra text accompanying note 69. A dialogue
among individuals listening carefully to each other is much more likely to generate good
results than one in which the participants' minds are already made up. Of course, mere em-
pathy is not enough. As Singer points out:
We cannot pretend to know everything and we cannot pretend to speak for others.
To define "we" as including everyone, we must engage with others, not abstractly,
but in fact; we must work with others whose experiences differ from our own in
ways that remake the power relationship between us.
Singer, supra note 32, at 1780 (citing EuZABETH V. SPELMAN, INEssENrIAL WOMAN: PROB-
LEMS Op EXCLUSION IN EMST THOUGHT 178-85 (1988)).
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arship 8 In that piece I argued that evidence scholars, in thinking
and writing about the Anglo-American system of adjudication, have
focused too narrowly on the goal of verdict accuracy to the exclusion
of other important goals of the system, and to the detriment of the
discourse within the evidence community. 9 As partial proof of my
theory, I documented modem evidence scholars' apparent failure to
notice that only a tiny fraction of cases are actually adjudicated, as
indicated by their near-total lack of participation in the scholarly
debates concerning ADR. ° Upon completion of that article, I be-
came determined to "put my money where my mouth is;" that is, to
examine the American adjudicatory system and the alternatives to it
from the perspective of a scholar whose primary interest is the law of
evidence.
I approach this task with an urban, middle-class background. I
am a product of a big-city public school system and an ivy league
post-secondary education. On two occasions, once while I was in high
school, and once while I was in law school, I participated in "abbre-
viated" trials in small claims court. The first time I participated as a
litigant and the second time as an advocate. Prior to law teaching, I
clerked for a federal appellate court and then practiced as a federal
prosecutor, specializing in organized crime, for about five years. Dur-
ing that time, I participated in approximately eight criminal jury trials
ranging in length from three days to about seven weeks. My experi-
ence with civil litigation was limited to representing the government
in one or two civil forfeiture actions in which I filed complaints,
conducted very limited discovery, and participated in settlement nego-
tiations.
Over the years, I occasionally witnessed portions of civil trials as
I waited my turn in federal court, and I talked periodically with
friends and law school classmates about their lives as civil litiga-
tors.9' Recently, I testified as an expert witness in a Section 1983
case in state court. Finally, as a scholar, I have read extensively
about civil litigation and discovery, as indicated by the sources refer-
enced in the footnotes of this Article.
88. See Seigel, supra note 13.
89. Id. at 1015-25.
90. See id. at 1018.
91. Prior to the time that I decided to become a law professor, I thought seriously
about switching from prosecution to civil litigation. I feared, however, that I would find the
professional life of a civil litigator-which I see as primarily consisting of extensive prepa-
ration for events that rarely take place (i.e., trials)-more frustrating than rewarding.
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B. Statement of the Problem
An important task for the neopragmatist legal scholar is to en-
sure that he properly and carefully diagnoses the problem he seeks to
address.' In the context of thiArticle, this pragmatic requirement
translates into a critical examination of the heretofore casual assump-
tion that there is a crisis of delay and congestion in American civil
justice systems. This assumption breaks down into two parts: the
empirical supposition that delay and congestion exist and, assuming
that they do, the normative conclusion that this delay and congestion
pose a problem for the system, its participants, and society at large.
The first place to look in undertaking an examination of these
assumptions is the pertinent scholarly discourse and empirical litera-
ture. Most scholars and judges who have written in the area seem to
think that are courts are crowded and slow,93 and the available statis-
tics lend strong support to their case. In federal court, for example,
the median time from filing to trial in 1990 was nineteen months,
almost double the 1950 figure. 4 Ten percent of all civil cases ter-
minated in 1990, including those dismissed and settled pre-trial, had
been pending more than twenty-nine months.95 In addition, although
the number of federal judges has increased significantly over the
years, this increase has not kept pace with the number of cases filed.
In 1950, for instance, litigants filed approximately 254 new cases per
judge;' by 1980, the number had risen to 327;9 and in 1990, the
figure was 381. 9' As a result, the size of the average federal judge's
civil docket has increased by almost 164 percent in the last forty
years, reaching about 424 cases in 1990.'
92. See supra text accompanying notes 82-87.
93. See Kaufman, supra note 7, at 1 ("IMhe nation's courts fall further and further
behind the promise of. . . '[a] just, speedy, and inexpensive delineation of every action.'")
(quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 1); Priest, Private Litigants, supra note 11, at 527 ("Litigation delay
has proven a ceaseless and unremitting problem of modem civil justice.").
94. 1990 REPORT, supra note 10, at 157 (Table C-5); 1950 DIR. ADMN. OFF. U.S. CTS.
ANN. REP. 152 (Table C-5) [hereinafter 1950 REPORT].
95. 1990 REPORT, supra note 10, at 157 (Table C-5).
96. 1980 REPORT, supra note 11, at 126 (Table 3).
97. 1&d
98. 1990 REPORT, supra note 10, at 133 (Table C showing 217,879 civil case filings
for the twelve month period ending June 30, 1990); id. at 307 (Table X-1A showing 571
federal judgeships).
99. 1990 REPORT, supra note 10, at 307 (Table X-1A showing 571 federal judgeships);
id at 133 (Table C showing 242,346 civil cases pending); 1980 REPORT, supra note 11, at
126 (Table 3 showing 55,603 civil cases pending before 215 judges). Judge Kaufman under-
took a similar comparison between the years 1949 and 1989 as he reflected on his forty
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Docket crunch and litigation delay are generally worse in state
courts. In the Los Angeles Superior Court, for instance, the median
time between the filing of a civil action and trial grew from 4.5
months in 1942 to 41.5 months in 1982."0 Worse yet, in Provi-
dence, Rhode Island, the median delay between complaint and adjudi-
cation was more than four years in 1984.12' In Chicago, during the
twenty year period from 1959 to 1979, the length of time from inci-
dent to trial grew steadily, with the overall average (mean) delay
being 5.68 years." Although these jurisdictions are at the extreme,
the average state court system is not faring much better. After review-
ing the pertinent data, Professor Alschuler concluded that "a waiting
period of two and one-half years between the filing of a lawsuit and
its disposition by jury trial now appears routine even in small city
jurisdictions."'03
Caseloads of this magnitude and delays of this length certainly
appear to present a legitimate problem, and perhaps a crisis, in Amer-
ican courts. Taking federal courts as an example, with four hundred
cases on each judge's docket, and about four hundred new cases
being filed each year per judge, federal judges must dispose of about
four hundred cases a year, each year, simply to stay afloat. This
amounts to the termination of between one and two cases every busi-
ness day."° It is not surprising that numbers like these have caused
judges to become more managerial, taking an active role in moving
cases along and pushing parties to settle. Furthermore, managerial
judging is only one of several negative phenomena associated with
court congestion."°5 For instance, how often can judges who are bur-
dened with enormous caseloads afford to write a thoughtful opinion
about the complex legal issues that might arise in a particular case?"°
years on the federal bench. See Kaufman, supra note 7, at 1, 2-3 & n.14.
100. See MOLLY SELVIN & PATRiciA A. EBENER, INSTIUTE FOR CIVIL JusTIcE, MANAG-
ING THE UNMANAGEABLE: A HISTORY OF CIVIL DELAY IN THE Los ANGELES SUPERIOR
COURT 27 (1984).
101. See BARRY MAHONEY ET AL., NATIONAL CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, IMPLEMENTING
DELAY REDUCTION AND DELAY PREVENTION PROGRAMS IN URBAN TRIAL COURTS: PRELIMI-
NARY FINDINGS FROM CURRENT RESEARCH 8 (1985).
102. See Priest, Role of the Jury, supra note 13, at 193.
103. Alschuler, supra note 13, at 1822.
104. Of course, judges have been unable to maintain this pace, which is why their case-
loads have been rising over the years.
105. The dangers of requiring judges to be case managers is the subject of Judith
Resnik's thoughtful and comprehensive article on the issue. See Resnik, Managerial Judges,
supra note 4, at 374. This issue is discussed in more detail below. See infra text accompa-
nying notes 192-93.
106. In addition, the burden on judges has, in my opinion, also impacted negatively on
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Delay in the courts also affects the experience of the individuals
and entities who resort to the judicial system for resolution of their
disputes. The mere fact that parties must wait years before their posi-
tion in a dispute is vindicated is a qualitative diminution of justice.
Moreover, to the extent that evidence becomes less trustworthy over
time, delay results in less accurate outcomes."e In addition, as oth-
their attitude toward the attorneys who appear before them. At the outset of this article I
quoted one judge who was honest enough to express his views in a published opinion. See
supra text accompanying note 1. More often, judges' frustrations find expression in less offi-
cial and usually undocumented ways.
A story from my practice illustrates this point. One of the largest and most important
cases I tried as a prosecutor was United States v. Gambino, 728 F. Supp. 1150 (E.D. Pa.
1989), aff"d, 926 F.2d 1355 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 415 (1991). The case involved
an international drug conspiracy conducted by alleged members of the Sicilian Mafia. It re-
suited in two trials, one approximately four weeks in length and one approximately seven
weeks in length, which together ended in the conviction of eleven defendants. The Chief
Judge of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, referred to
here as "Judge B" out of respect and courtesy, presided over the two trials as well as an
extensive set of pre-trial hearings.
Including the time I spent providing legal assistance during the investigation, the case
represented the better part of two years of my professional life. As it turned out, Judge B
scheduled the sentencing of a number of the defendants at a time when I was trying another
case in the same courthouse. To accommodate his court dayi Judge B scheduled these
sentencings for either 9:30 a.m. or 4:00 p.m. After all of my work, I wanted to participate in
the sentencing hearings. I asked Judge B to move the hearings one half-hour each--to 9:00
a.m. and 4:30 p.m. That way, I could attend at least part of each hearing before or after I
had to appear in court on the other case. The rest could be left to co-counsel.
Judge B refused my request. I was stunned. By that time, he knew me quite well,
and I thought he would surely grant me this simple courtesy. I decided to ask the other
judge if he could accommodate me in any way. I did so by letter, and, out of courtesy, I
sent Judge B a copy.
Much to my dismay, Judge B reacted by writing me a three page letter describing the
court's caseload and lambasting me for having the audacity to expect the court to accommo-
date the schedule of an Assistant United States Attorney. But he did not stop there. He ef-
fectively punished me by copying the letter to all of the other judges in the district. Because
he did not recount my specific request, the impression left by this letter was that I had
asked for some outrageous favor from the court. I spent a week trying to figure out how to
re-establish my reputation in the courthouse in light of this attack.
After much consternation, I decided to do nothing. I figured that any attempt to com-
municate my side of the story to the other judges would only make the Chief Judge angrier,
an outcome I could not afford. A few days later, another judge in the district-before whom
I had never appeared-wrote me a letter instructing that I never request a continuance in his
courtroom.
Perhaps I am wrong, but I believe that in earlier times, before the pressure of huge
caseloads dominated their professional lives, judges were more accommodating of the lawyers
who appeared before them.
107. See David S. Clark, Adjudication to Administration: A Statistical Analysis of Federal
District Courts in the TWentieth Century, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 65, 74 (1981) ("Either party
may legitimately worry that a crucial witness will forget the facts, disappear, or die before a
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ers have pointed out, the burden of delay does not fall equally on all
litigants."0 8 Delay is probably least troublesome for large ongoing
business concerns; to them, litigation is just a cost of doing business
that can be factored into each year's operating budget. But for smaller
concerns, and for individuals, the price of delay can be tremendous.
Personal injury plaintiffs, for example, are harmed by continuation of
the status quo during the pendency of a lawsuit; they may have medi-
cal and other expenses that cannot be met until judgment is entered
(and collected). Some defendants will also be harmed by delay. Con-
sider, for example, a physician who is named in a non-meritorious
malpractice suit; she must wait until the conclusion of the case for
vindication of her reputation, and she may suffer serious consequenc-
es, such as loss of respect by colleagues or loss of patient following,
in the meantime.
The problem of civil litigation delay is thus one that merits
attention."° The next section explores the parameters of a possible
case comes to trial.").
108. Id. at 74; see also Fiss, supra note 18 at 1076.
109. Some commentators have come to a different conclusion-or at least have appeared
to do so. For example, both Marc Galanter and Austin Sarat have challenged the notion that
we are experiencing a "litigation crisis" in this country. See Galanter, Landscape, supra note
13; Sarat, supra note 13. A close look at their analysis, however, reveals that it is only
tangentially related to the concerns addressed in this Article. Both Sarat and Galanter attempt
to document that Americans do not file an excessive number of lawsuits relative to the num-
ber of potential disputes that arise from their social and economic activity and when com-
pared with litigation rates from other eras and other countries. All this might be true, but it
does not have much to do with the question whether judges are adequately dealing with the
disputes that do end up in the courthouse.
In addition, though, Sarat does express some skepticism about the degree of the bur-
den presently facing our courts. See Sarat, supra note 13, at 330. He relies, in part, on the
findings of Professor Clark. Writing in 1981, Clark demonstrated that the average duration of
civil cases in the federal courts was much worse in the early part of the twentieth century,
and that "delay has stabilized at between 0.9 and 1.3 years" after World War II. Clark, supra
note 107, at 80. Presumably, Clark's figures are different from those set forth above, see
supra text accompanying notes 94-102, because he computed the average duration of all civil
cases while I referenced the median duration of only those cases that go to trial.
Even assuming that Clark's statistics are accurate, I do not think that they successfully
refute the proposition that court congestion is a problem. First, his statistics are for federal
court only; much of the problem exists in state courts. Second, a year-long delay is nothing
to be to happy about, even if it has historical roots. Third, Clark's statistics do not refute the
proposition that parties who seek actual adjudication-i.e., a trial-must wait longer to get it.
Fourth, and most interestingly, I do not think that a "litigation year" in 1940 is equivalent to
a "litigation year" in 1993. The difference comes from the progress we have made in the
speed of travel and communication during this interval of time. In the 1940s, lawyers and
litigants relied on first class mail, manual or electric typewriters, carbon copies, manual filing
systems, and trains. In the 1990s, we have fax machines, overnight mail, computers, laser
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solution.
C. Normative and Empirical Underpinnings of the AJT
In recent years, judges, scholars, and other interested parties have
suggested a variety of solutions to the problem of court congestion
and delay.10° Courts have implemented a number of these solutions,
such as the judicial management of cases,"' court-annexed arbitra-
tion,"2 Summary Jury Trials,"3 and the restriction of diversity ju-
risdiction,"4 with only modest success. Some other proposals, such
as Alschuler's Two-Tiered Trial System,"' have yet to be tried.
Despite the proliferation of ideas, this Article suggests that a new
reform proposal, the Abbreviated Jury Trial ("AJT"), be added to the
mix. The essential reason is this: the AJT would achieve a unique
and, at least in some contexts, superior balance among the normative
goals of our civil justice system. As a "more efficient" jury trial, the
AJT would attempt to further the following normative objectives
simultaneously: (1) the efficient resolution of disputes; (2) the pro-
duction of accurate juridical outcomes; (3) the production of socially
printers, and jet planes. A one year delay in 1993 is thus qualitatively different than it was
in 1943.
Let me illustrate this point with an analogy. I would guess that fifty years ago, before
the advent of the interstate highway system, travel between New York and Philadelphia
(roughly ninety miles) took about four hours. In the 1990s, on the Wednesday before Thanks-
giving, the trip takes about the same length of time because one must "crawl" on severely
overcrowded highways. Despite the similarity in the duration of these trips, the nature of the
experience for the travelers is obviously very different.
110. Clark suggests that two basic approaches have been taken toward the problem of
court delay: the "judicial-professional" approach, which divides among individuals who favor
increasing the number of judges and those who favor restricting access to the courts; and the
"bureaucratic-administrative" response, which holds that better management of cases can effec-
tively reduce delay. See Clark, supra note 105, at 74-78. During the twentieth century, strate-
gies derived from both of these approaches have been implemented, at least to some degree.
Id. at 77-78 (noting increasingly bureaucratic nature of the federal courts); see id. at 86-88
(tables showing the rise in the number of federal judges during the twentieth century).
111. See Resnik, Managerial Judges, supra note 4, at 374.
112. See Kaufman, supra note 7, at 17-22 (describing court-annexed arbitration).
113. See Kaufman, supra note 7, at 13-17; Thomas D. Lambros, The Summary Jury
Trial-An Alternative Method of Resolving Disputes, 69 JuDICATURE 286 (1986); Richard
Posner, The Summary Jury Trial and Other Methods of Alternative Dispute Resolution: Some
Cautionary Observations, 53 U. CHi. L. REV. 366, 368-69 (1986).
114. Effective in 1990, Congress increased the jurisdictional amount for diversity cases
from $10,000 to $50,000. This led to a fifteen percent decline in diversity filings during the
fiscal year ending June 30, 1990, which was an important factor in an overall decline in
civil case filings of seven percent. See 1990 REPORT, supra note 10, at 8-9.
115. See Alschuler, supra note 13.
19941
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW
acceptable outcomes; (4) the public adjudication of disputes, meaning
the maintenance of a system characterized by cases in which facts are
found on the record during proceedings accessible to other litigants
and the general public; and (5) decision-making by a fair, impartial,
and non-governmental entity.
11 6
Listing these normative objectives, although a critical step in
scholarship conforming to the neopragmatic methodology outlined
above,"7 is easy. The analysis that follows takes up the much more
difficult (and equally pragmatic) tasks of justifying the importance of
each normative goal"' and describing in detail how an abbreviated
jury trial procedure would seek to achieve them."'
1. The Efficient Resolution of Disputes
The AJT proposal rests on two fundamental premises: first, that
the pace of civil litigation can be improved by designing a dramat-
ically shorter jury trial; and second, that the only realistic means of
ensuring a shorter trial is by fixing its length in advance through the
116. I have previously discussed in the abstract the importance of these normative goals
to the formation and evaluation of evidence doctrine. See Seigel, supra note 13, at 1015-20;
cf. Judith Resnik, Tiers, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 837, 845-59 (1984) (discussing a long list of
values underlying adjudicatory procedures).
117. See supra text accompanying note 82.
118. The subsequent analysis does not address the goal of efficiency. The justification for
the goal of maintaining an efficient dispute resolution system has already been made in the
context of explaining why court congestion is a legitimate problem. See supra text accompa-
nying notes 92-107.
119. I think it important to note that the AJT is not the only possible method of solving
the court congestion problem in a manner potentially consistent with the objectives of the
civil justice system stated in the text. Other possible solutions would include the creation of
a sufficiently comprehensive and generous social welfare system to replace personal injury
litigation, or the legalization of controlled substances, which would dramatically reduce the
number of criminal trials, thereby freeing up significant additional judicial resources for civil
litigation. My reasons for promoting the AJT over these possible solutions to the court con-
gestion problem and others like them are several-and are derived from nothing more pro-
found than my limitations as a human and scholar. First, other possible solutions to the con-
gestion problem involve normative positions and empirical assumptions that I have not inves-
tigated and do not feel comfortable defending. In contrast, the AJT requires consideration of
issues raised by the process of litigation itself, an area in which, as a former trial lawyer and
current evidence professor, I have considerably more expertise. Second, as I made clear in
my statement of subjectivity, my ruminations about the AJT arise out of my belief that evi-
dence scholars ought to be involved in the process of designing and testing alternative meth-
ods of dispute resolution. Thus the AT is a procedural solution relying in large part on a
redesign of evidence rules. Finally, I do not care to invest a large amount of time and effort
in a futile endeavor; my intuitive sense is that I am significantly more likely to achieve
change by offering courts a new method of dispute resolution than by arguing for hotly
contested changes in substantive civil or criminal law.
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imposition of severely limited and strictly enforced time constraints
on each party's courtroom presentation.
The proposition that a reduction in the length of jury trials
would translate into a reduction in overall civil litigation delay is,
perhaps, counterintuitive. After all, it is well documented that the bulk
of litigation delay-months or even years-occurs during the pre-Lial
stage of a case."2r By way of comparison, the average civil jury
trial is only three or four days long.' On this point, however, anal-
yses of the civil trial system have yielded two critical, and related,
findings. First, the slow pace of litigation is a matter of ingrained
legal culture. In any given jurisdiction, lawyers quickly learn unwrit-
ten rules about how long a case typically gets strung out before it
actually goes to trial, and they act accordingly." Second, the most
effective means of resolving a civil dispute is a firm trial date.' As
some commentators have noted, trial is a "doomsday event." When a
lawyer knows his time is up, he will pull his case together and either
settle it or, if necessary, proceed in court. 24
120. See, e.g., REPORT TO THE PEOPLE Op PHILADELPHIA FRoM THE OFFICE OF THE
DISTRICT ATrORNEY 99 (1970-71); Griffin B. Bell et al., Automatic Disclosure in Discov-
ery-The Rush to Reform, 27 GA. L. REV. 1, 10 (1992); Stephen C. Yeazell, The Misunder-
stood Consequences of Modem Civil Process, 1994 WIs. L. REv. 631, 639.
121. This is a very rough figure because there appears to be considerable variation in the
average length of trials around the country. In Chicago, the mean trial length for all civil
cases tried between 1959 and 1979 was 3.8 days. Priest, Role of the Jury, supra note 13, at
174 (Table 1). In contrast, a 1985 estimate of the average length of civil jury trials in Los
Angeles was fourteen days. Sipes, supra note 13, at 314-15. At the other end of the spec-
trum, the average length of civil trials in Portland, Oregon in 1982 was only 1.9 days, al-
though this represented a sixty percent increase over the 1972 figure. See Sipes, supra note
13, at 315.
122. For example, the National Center for State Courts, after conducting an extensive
study of civil litigation delay, concluded:
[B]oth quantitative and qualitative data generated in this research strongly suggest
that both speed and backlog are determined in large part by established expecta-
tions, practices, and informal rules of behavior of judges and attorneys. For want
of a better term, we have called this cluster of related factors the "local legal
culture." Court systems become adapted to a given pace of . . .litigation. That
pace has a court backlog of pending cases associated with it. It also has an ac-
companying backlog of open files in attorneys' offices. These expectations and
practices, together with court and attorney backlog, must be overcome in any suc-
cessful attempt to increase the pace of litigation.
THOMAS CHURCH Er AL., JusTICE DELAYED: THE PACE OF LmOATON IN URBAN TRIAL
COuRTS 54 (1978).
123. See Sipes, supra note 13, at 311 ("[T]he single most effective stimulant to settle-
ment . . . is the scheduling of a firm and unavoidable trial date in the near future.").
124. See, e.g., Kaufman, supra note 7, at 15-16 (noting that a Summary Jury Trial is a
doomsday event which, like real trials, causes parties to examine their case closely and inten-
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In response to these findings, many courts have improved their
monitoring of pre-trial processes, and delay that once was caused by
dilatory discovery and other pre-trial practices has been reduced in
many jurisdictions."t2 But, as noted above, court congestion has not
improved. This is because judges cannot change the fact that, no
matter how many cases are ready for trial at any given time, only
one case can be tried in each available courtroom, while the
remainder languish. Moreover, when more than one case is scheduled
to start trial on a given day, lawyers tend to discount the doomsday
nature of that trial date in terms of both their preparation for trial and
their willingness to enter into serious settlement negotiations."2 The
court calendar, it turns out, is the bottleneck in the process of resolv-
ing civil disputes.
If employed on a significant basis, AJTs would improve the pace
of civil litigation by substantially increasing the number of trials a
court could schedule in a year. Let us assume that AJTs would con-
sume, on average, sixty percent less time than full-blown jury trials,
and that they were substituted for such trials, fifty percent of the
time."7 Under such conditions, AJTs would automatically increase
the number of cases a court could dispose of in a year by thirty
percent. But the effect of a fixed-length jury trial on the pace of liti-
gation would probably be even greater. Given that the duration of
AJTs would be known in advance, courts could schedule firm trial
dates for them, back-to-back. Thus, at any given time, a greater num-
ber of lawyers would be facing doomsday than present trial proce-
dures permit."
sify their settlement efforts).
125. See Sipes, supra note 13, at 312 (noting that "court control of the pace of litigation
during all pretrial stages has produced dramatic improvements in shortening the time required
to bring disputes to a conclusion"); see also Steven Flanders, Blind Umpires-A Response to
Professor Resnik, 35 IASTaS L.J. 505, 517-19 (1984) (Tables 1 and 2) (examining statistics
from six federal district courts indicating that pre-trial judicial management decreases case
dispobition times and increases settlements). I should note, however, that some kinds of judi-
cial intervention in the pre-trial process, particularly judicial activism in promoting settlement,
appear to have been largely ineffectual. Galanter, Judicial Mediation, supra note 18, at 8-10.
126. See Sipes, supra note 13, at 315 (observing that longer trials result in the reduction
of the number of cases both tried and settled).
127. These numbers are discussed in greater detail below. See infra text accompanying
notes 137.40.
128. Professor Priest has argued that reforms aimed at the reduction of delay between the
time of filing and the time of trial will not reduce the backlog of cases over the long run
because there is an inverse relationship between the length of delay and parties' willingness
to accept settlement. In other words, when cases start to move faster, more parties choose to
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How could one guarantee a system marked by short fixed-length
trials? The only feasible method is to place the burden of time limits
squarely on the shoulders of trial lawyers. The other available op-
tion-judicial management of courtroom litigation-has failed misera-
bly, which should have come as no surprise. No matter how far a
judge delves into the management of a case, she will always be at
the mercy of the lawyers for information about their legal theories
and the evidence necessary to prove them. If counsel claims that five
witnesses are needed to prove essential facts, the judge can legiti-
mately challenge his representation only if she knows the content of
the witnesses' testimony, their credibility, and the importance of their
testimony to the attorney's case. Acquiring this information is ex-
tremely burdensome; in most cases it would consume more of the
court's time than it would take to let the five witnesses testify before
the jury.129
On the other hand, limiting a party's evidence without a thor-
ough grasp of its alleged significance is risky because, if the judge
go to trial, slowing the pace of the system down once again. He calls this the "equilibrium
hypothesis." See Priest, Private Litigants, supra note 11, at 531-57.
My response to Priest is twofold. First, as he recognizes, the equilibrium hypothesis
does not preclude the possibility that a given reform could bring a system to a new equilibri-
um point characterized by less congestion. See id. at 557. This limitation on the importance
of Priest's hypothesis appears to be confirmed by the fact that the length of delay experi-
enced by courts across jurisdictional boundaries is subject to significant variation; the equi-
librium hypothesis is obviously not accounting for one or more factors affecting the pace of
litigation. See Geoffrey P. Miller, Comment: Some Thoughts on the Equilibrium Hypothesis,
69 B.U. L. REV. 561, 567 (1989). Second, as Priest notes in a later article, the equilibrium
hypothesis does not apply if a proposed reform would also increase the settlement rate. See
Priest, Role of the Jury, supra note 13, at 198-99 (arguing that elimination of the civil jury
in a large number of cases would affect the pace of litigation by shortening trials and in-
creasing settlement rate). AJTs would increase the settlement rate because they would create a
full scale doomsday event-the exchange of trial plans-prior to a firm trial date. See infra
text accompanying notes 171-76.
129. See, e.g., Frederick B. Lacey, Proposed Techniques for Streamlining Trial of Com-
plex Antitrust Cases: Pro and Con, 48 A.B.A. ANTr'RUST L.J. 487 (1979). Judge Lacey
relates that he required counsel in a complex case to submit
their preliminary proposed findings of fact, annotated to names of proposed wit-
nesses, exhibits . . . depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions.
I . . . then had each side criticize each proposed finding of fact of his adversary.
These were submitted to me in book form . . . . In numerous instances, disputes
disappeared. In other cases, the critique would state that only a particular phrase
within a lengthy proposal was disputed. Elimination of that phrase eliminated that
dispute. Stipulations in great numbers resulted, and the parties were thereby saved
the necessity of producing substantial evidence at trial.
Id. at 488. By placing the burden of wasted time on the litigants, the AJT would achieve the
same result without this huge expenditure of judicial resources.
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miscalculates, she may be reversed on appeal for abuse of discre-
tion"' or violation of due process." Reversal would, of course,
mean trying the entire case all over again. Thus, under the current
system, judges are under tremendous pressure to give lawyers consid-
erable latitude in presenting evidence to support their case.'
Lawyers, of course, have little or no reason to speed litigation
along. Consider first, the economic incentives. Lawyers who bill by
the hour are happy to be in court because the clock is running. Some
even charge a premium for court time; for them, prolonging a trial is
especially rewarding. Many other civil litigators are paid on a contin-
gency basis; after investing in a case, they are motivated to win, not
rush. Only lawyers who have accepted a flat fee for a trial arguably
130. See, e.g., Secretary of Labor v. DeSisto, 929 F.2d 789 (1st Cit. 1991) (finding
abuse of discretion for limiting parties to the presentation of one witness each). On two
occasions, the Seventh Circuit has noted its disapproval of arbitrary limits on the parties'
courtroom presentations, but it avoided reversal. McKnight v. General Motors Corp., 908 F.2d
104, 114-15 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding that defendant failed to preserve the issue on appeal),
cert. denied, 499 U.S. 919 (1991); Flaminio v. Honda Motor Co., 733 F.2d 463, 473 (7th
Cir. 1984) (holding that plaintiff failed to show prejudice from the time restriction).
131. Although courts have not yet looked at the issue from the perspective of due pro-
cess, at least one scholar believes that this constitutional guarantee may be implicated by
arbitrary time or witness limits. See John E. Rumel, The Hourglass and Due Process: The
Propriety of Time Limits on Civil Trials, 26 U.S.F. L. REV. 237, 250-59 (1992).
132. Despite the disincentives, some courts have imposed strict time limits for the pre-
sentation of proof. See Juneau Square Corp. v. First Wis. Nat'l Bank, 475 F. Supp. 451,
465-66 (E.D. Wis. 1979) (holding time limits imposed on the parties to be reasonable), affid,
624 F.2d 798 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 1013 (1980); MCI Communications Corp. v.
AT&T Co., 85 F.R.D. 28, 29-32 (N.D. IM. 1979) (imposing strict time limits on parties in
upcoming litigation), a.f'd, 708 F.2d 1081, 1170-73 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
891 (1983); SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 77 F.R.D. 10, 15-16 (D. Conn. 1977) (limiting
plaintiff's case in antitrust action to six months).
In line with this growing trend, the December 1993 amendments to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 16(c) added subparagraph (15) which explicitly authorizes a judge to enter a
pre-trial order "establishing a reasonable limit on the time allowed for presenting evidence."
Although this amendment represents movement in the right direction, it falls to take the
critical step of shifting the burden of shorter trials from the judge to the parties. The adviso-
ry committee's note to Rule 16(c)(15) makes clear that the judge is responsible for ensuring
that time limits are "reasonable" in light of the parties' need and desire to present evidence,
which means that trial courts' decisions to limit the proof in a case remain subject to being
second guessed by courts of appeal. The comments also state that time limits should be im-
posed only after the court expends the time and energy necessary to examine all of the pro-
posed evidence in the case. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(15) advisory committee's notes.
In contrast, the AJT would operate under the assumption that if parties were told near
the outset of the litigation that they would have a specific amount of time in which to pres-
ent their evidence, and if the rules of evidence were significantly changed to facilitate a more
efficient trial, the court could enforce its time limits strictly without fear of reversal. The
burden would be on the parties to fit their presentations into the allotted time.
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want to see it end as quickly as possible, although winning is still
more important to their long term economic well-being than trimming
hours, a point that is probably not lost on most of them.
Second, in their pursuit of victory, trial lawyers have good rea-
son to introduce every last bit of evidence even remotely relevant to
their case. The odds of losing a case by putting on too much proof
are extremely low,133 while the possibility of losing it by failing to
introduce a bit of marginal but available evidence-though also
low-is a litigator's nightmare."3  Additionally, a litigator has typi-
cally lived with a case for years before it comes to trial; such famil-
iarity often causes lawyers to lose perspective, to be unable to dif-
ferentiate between critical and tangential evidence. Finally, civil litiga-
tors rarely get to try a case before a jury. When they are presented
with this opportunity, they are naturally inclined to savor every min-
ute of it.
Lawyers also make intentional strategic decisions that cause trials
to be inefficient. As one judge has noted, litigators sometimes try to
bury the weakness of some aspects of their case in an avalanche of
evidence in support of other points.' 35 Even more significant, law-
yers sometimes use the rules of evidence as a strategic sword, forcing
their opponent to jump through evidentiary hoops on issues that they
know to be essentially incontestable. The result is extreme inefficien-
cy in the way cases are tried."3
133. The odds are not so low as to preclude this possibility. For example, sometimes a
minor defendant's best strategy in a multi-defendant case is to "hide" from the jury. Altema-
tively, a lawyer who grossly "overtries" her case by presenting large amounts of cumulative
evidence risks creating resentment and ill-will among at least some members of the jury.
134. As Judge Bertelsman has observed:
It would seem that early in the career of every trial lawyer, he or she has
lost a case by leaving something out, and thereupon resolved never again to omit
even the most inconsequential item of possible evidence from any future trial.
Thereafter, in an excess of caution the attorney tends to overtry his case by pre-
senting vast quantities of cumulative or marginally relevant evidence.
United States v. Reaves, 636 F. Supp. 1575, 1576 (E.D. Ky. 1986).
135. Reaves, 636 F. Supp. at 1578 ("If [an attorney] believes he can win th[e] case by
proliferating the evidence of the favorable, but relatively uncontested matters so that the
weaker aspects of the case will be camouflaged, it is asking too much of our fallen nature to
expect him voluntarily to do otherwise.").
136. An example from my practice helps make this point. In the second Gambino trial,
see supra note 106, the prosecution introduced about fifty surveillance photographs showing
the defendants meeting each other, and other individuals, on street comers in Philadelphia and
New York. Defense counsel insisted that the government's witnesses not be permitted to refer
to any of the individuals in the photographs by name unless the witness had personal knowl-
edge of the individual's identity, which was the defense's prerogative under Federal Rule of
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Trials can be shortened, then, only by placing the burden of trial
length on the individuals who have the means to control it-the law-
yers. And the only real way to shift this burden is to give each law-
yer a fixed amount of time in which to present his case. Shorter trials
would lead to the faster resolution of disputes and less burdensome
court dockets. The normative goal of increasing efficiency would be
achieved.
Thus, the ANI format might operate something like this. Early in
the course of litigation, shortly after the decision was made to pro-
ceed by AJT, 37 the court, in consultation with the parties, would
Evidence 602. Defense counsel further insisted that the photographs not be admitted in evi-
dence or shown to the jury until all the individuals in them were identified, which was argu-
ably their right under Federal Rules of Evidence 102, 401, and 402. Because most of the
government's surveillance witnesses were FBI agents who knew the identity of the photo-
graphed individuals only as a result of being briefed by other agents, the defense objections
made introduction of the photographs extremely cumbersome and time consuming. Several
days worth of court time was spent authenticating the photographs. During much of this time,
witnesses testified to the identity of individuals in the pictures while the pictures-not yet in
evidence-were hidden from the jury.
One defendant took the witness stand. On cross examination, I asked her to identify
all of the individuals in the photographs in quick succession. In a matter of minutes, the
witness identified scores of individuals and, in the process, revealed that the government's
identifications had been completely accurate. The rules of evidence had permitted the defense
to require days of confusing testimony for the government to prove minutes of straight-for-
ward information. Defense counsel had made the strategic decision to disrupt the
government's case as much as the rules would allow.
I recognize that there is less room for this kind of strategy in civil litigation, where
the rules of civil procedure require the parties to narrow the scope of their disagreement prior
to trial. See, e.g., FED. R. CiV. P. 36 (addressing requests for admissions). But the existence
of these rules cannot completely eliminate strategies that are designed to disrupt an
opponent's proof-which lengthen the amount of time it takes to try the case. See supra note
106.
137. At least in its experimental stages, AJTs should be employed only with the prior
consent of all litigants. If AJTs lived up to their claim of providing a faster and less expen-
sive means of dispute resolution than full-blown jury trials without a perceptible reduction in
the accuracy and acceptability of verdicts, an increasing number of litigants would voluntarily
submit to the summary procedure. At some juncture, though, as the AT became an accepted
form of adjudication, it would make sense to empower courts, on motion of a party, to order
that a particular case be resolved by means of an AMT. This would allow use of the AT in
cases in which one party would otherwise pursue a strategy of delay as a means of preserv-
ing a favorable status quo.
I do not anticipate, however, that the AJT would ever totally displace the other forms
of dispute resolution, from alternatives such as mediation and arbitration to the "full-blown
jury trial." Pragmatism counsels against formulating a unitary answer to a multifaceted prob-
lem, see supra text accompanying note 55, which appears to be sound advice in this setting.
Each of the existing forms of dispute resolution offers a unique balance among the normative
goals of the system, and each has its place in that system. Indeed, as the various methods of
ADR become more common, scholars might think about establishing guidelines to assist judg-
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determine the length of each side's courtroom presentation. For the
AJT to be a meaningful alternative, the length of time allotted for it
would normally be no more-and hopefully significantly less-than
fifty percent of the time necessary for a conventional jury trial. Addi-
tionally, capitalizing on the economies of scale, the time reduction for
an AJT would increase as the anticipated trial length increased. For
instance, a five day conventional trial might result in a two day AJT,
whereas a two week (ten day) conventional trial would be fit into a
three day AJT. At the far end, there would be a presumption that no
AJT would last longer than two weeks. Thus trials that might take
three or even six months in their "full-blown" mode would in the
normal course be fit into a two week AJT
The court would have to allocate AJT hours among the parties.
In many instances, this allocation would not be equal; the party with
the burden of proof would normally need more time to put on its
case. The critical feature of the AJT would be this: once the court
determined the length of time for a party's presentation, this decision
would not, absent the most extreme circumstances, be subject to
alteration. Rather, trial counsel would be responsible for tailoring her
presentation to fit the predetermined time allotment. If the clock were
to run out before counsel's presentation was complete, it would be
counsel's problem, not the court's.
In order to be effective, AJTs would need to operate in lieu of
conventional jury trials, not as a prelude to them. Thus, the verdict
rendered in an AJT would have the same effect as the verdict ren-
dered after a full-blown jury trial. The losing party would, of course,
have a right of appeal, but it would not be entitled to a trial de novo
regulated by* the conventional rules of evidence. This would prevent
AJTs from becoming yet another settlement technique, which is inevi-
table if parties have the right to a trial de novo.39 It also means
that AJTs would not operate in the shadow of conventional trials, in
which case the AJT's summary procedures would serve little purpose.
es in the task of "litigation triage," that is, the task of determining early in litigation the
process that is most likely to resolve a dispute in a manner most beneficial to the litigants
and the public.
138. If these time limits seem a bit arbitrary, it is because they are. A fundamental
premise lurking underneath the AJT is that, with sufficient freedom from the current rules of
evidence, lawyers could make effective presentations in any reasonable amount of time allot-
ted to them.
139. We do not need another settlement technique. We need a more efficient means of
adjudication. See infra text accompanying notes 192-202.
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With a right to trial de novo, attorneys would simply discount AJT
outcomes to the extent that the evidentiary mix of a conventional trial
might be different. 4°
2. Ensuring Accurate Verdicts
Efficiency in the civil jury system is important, but it should not
be purchased at the price of inaccurate verdicts. 4 ' In this regard, the
AJT is founded on the following premises: (1) with sufficient changes
in the rules regulating pre-trial discovery and the admission of evi-
dence, parties could adequately present a case in less than half the
time needed for a conventional jury trial, and; (2) means substantially
less cumbersome than the application of the current rules of evidence
could be effective in ensuring that the adjudicatory process (a) does
not become tainted by inaccurate or untruthful information and (b)
does not lose the benefits of an adversarial encounter.
The first of these premises is surprisingly easy to defend. In
comparison with almost all other methods of modem communication,
the cumbersome nature of jury trials is astonishing. Consider, for
example, feature length movies and television documentaries. Through
these media, extremely complex stories are told in a very short period
of time, and these stories are comprehended by the very same indi-
viduals who serve on petit juries. If the rules permitted it, there is no
inherent reason why litigants' stories could not be communicated in
the courtroom with similar impact and efficiency.
Nor is it possible to distinguish non-adjudicatory settings from
all others by the importance of the decisions being made, or by the
adversarial nature of the process. An example from the business
world can illustrate this point. Assume that a company is trying to
decide whether to introduce a new product into the market. To assist
in making this decision, the company vice-president might ask a team
140. I am not the first scholar to propose the imposition of strict time limits on civil
jury trials. See, e.g., Roger W. Kirst, Finding a Role for the Civil Jury in Modem Litigation,
69 JUDICATURE 333, 338 (1986) (arguing for strict time limits, coupled with "fewer issues,
more efficient presentation of evidence, and a changed style of litigation"). I believe, howev-
er, that I am the first to articulate a robust justification for such a proposal and to present a
fully-developed picture of the changes in the rules of evidence and procedure that would be
essential to its success.
141. This normative statement requires no elaborate justification. If anything, I anticipate
that the AJT will be criticized for failing to provide sufficient protection against inaccurate
verdicts. Such an attack will arise out of what I have elsewhere characterized as evidence
scholars' excessive preoccupation with the goal of verdict accuracy. See Seigel, supra note
13, at 1008.
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of subordinates to research the issue and make recommendations. The
employees would presumably conduct studies, gather facts, interpret
evidence, and reach a set of conclusions. During this process, some
on the research team might disagree with their colleagues and develop
a minority position. At the appropriate time, the subordinates would
present their findings and recommendations to the vice-president,
probably through an audio-visual presentation. If a minority position
had developed, the vice president would be presented with conflicting,
adversarial points of view. How long would the presentation last? In
most cases, it would probably span a couple of hours or, if the deci-
sion were extremely critical, perhaps a few days. On the basis of this
information, the vice-president would make a final decision, perhaps
risking millions of dollars in the process.
Presently, trials do not resemble television documentaries or
business presentations because of the rules of evidence. The primary
function of the rules is to further the accuracy of trial verdicts.'42
The rules achieve this goal, however, by impeding the kind of direct
and concise communication that takes place outside of the adjudicato-
ry setting. The AJT is based on the conviction that a trade-off be-
tween accurate verdicts and effective courtroom presentations is not
inevitable.'43
The AJT would increase efficiency without overly sacrificing
accuracy by seeking to capitalize on two revolutionary changes that
have affected civil litigation during the twentieth century: civil discov-
ery, which came into being when the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure were enacted in 1938; and videotape technology, which became
routine and inexpensive during the 1970s and 1980s.
142. Il
143. Thus, the AJT proposal only partially assumes, in the words of Professor Resnik,
"that the quantum of information produced by adjudication is unnecessary---that outcomes
every bit as good can be produced with less data, less formality, and fewer constraints."
Resnik, Adjudicatory Decline. supra note 13, at 554. Some of the information communicated
during full blown jury trials is unnecessary because trial lawyers have little incentive to ex-
amine the proof with an eye toward eliminating the excess. See supra text accompanying
notes 135-36. The AJT seeks to give them this incentive. But the AJT also seeks to permit a
more direct form of communication between advocate and fact finder, not by eliminating
formality and constraints, but by replacing some of the formality and constraints that present-
ly regulate litigants' courtroom presentations with pre-trial safeguards. In so doing, however,
the AJT proposal does reject Professor Landsman's argument that the slow pace of adjudica-
tion caused by roles of procedure and evidence is essential to the integrity of the process.
See Stephan Landsman, The Decline of the Adversary System: How the Rhetoric of Swift and
Certain Justice Has Affected Adjudication in American Courts, 29 BUFF. L. REV. 487, 499-
501 (1980).
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Discovery has permanently altered the landscape of litigation. As
a result of discovery, civil trials are no longer pure adversarial clashes
during which parties learn about, and react to, their opponent's case.
Instead, post-discovery trials mostly consist of presenting to a third
party-the jury-evidence that the parties already know quite well.
The witnesses' testimony is generally a repeat of their deposition
testimony, and the documents and other tangible evidence introduced
at trial have been produced and meticulously examined by the parties
at an earlier time.'"
At the same time, videotape technology has fundamentally altered
the possible methods through which deposition testimony can be
preserved. For generations, the traditional form of preserving testimo-
ny has been, of course, transcription by a court reporter. When this
was the only method of preservation, repetition of deposition testimo-
ny at trial made sense: it was needed to provide the jury with the
opportunity to observe the witnesses' demeanor. With the advent of
videotape technology, this is no longer the case. Although it is not
identical, if properly recorded and replayed, videotaped testimony is
sufficiently close to the live event to eliminate the necessity of
repetition.'45
This latter claim is supported by solid empirical research. In
Videotape on Trial, Professors Miller and Fontes report the findings
of a series of fourteen studies conducted over a period of four years
examining a multitude of issues raised by the use of videotape in the
civil fact-finding process." Unlike some social scientists,4 7 IMiler
144. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501 (1947) (stating that the discovery rules
were intended to enable the parties "to obtain the fullest possible knowledge of the issues
and facts before trial"); see also Richard L. Marcus, Myth and Reality in Protective Order
Litigation, 69 CoRELL L. REv. 1, 6 (1983) ("The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were
designed to effect a revolution in litigation by broadening the availability of discovery. They
did so . . ... ). In fact, the recent trend has been in the direction of instituting faster and
more automatic pre-trial discovery. For instance, the December 1, 1993 amendments to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure instituted mandatory pre-trial disclosure of all experts, wit-
nesses, and exhibits to be used at trial. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)-(3); see also Theodore J.
Hamilton, The 1993 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: How the Changes
Will Affect Your Life, FLA. B.J., May 1994, at 36, 38-39.
145. See GERALD R. MILLER & NORMAN E. FoNTEs, VmEOTAPE ON TRIAL (1979); see
also James L. MeCrystal & Ann B. Maschari, Will Electronic Technology Take the Witness
Stand?, 11 TOLEDO L. REv. 239 (1980) (advocating pre-recorded videotaped trials); Charles
R. Richey, Rule 16 Revisited: Reflections for the Benefit of Bench and Bar, 139 F.R.D. 525,
535-36 (1991).
146. See MILLE & FONTMES, supra note 145, at 7, 10.
147. See Seigel, supra note 13, at 1040.
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and Fontes were extremely sensitive to the nuances and legal com-
plexities of the trial setting; they consulted extensively with lawyers
and judges as they planned their research. 48 They also took great
care to account for the methodological problems that inhere in jury
simulations. For example, they routinely sought to replicate the find-
ings of one study with a second one, often with a different de-
sign.149 As a result of their research, Miller and Fontes came to the
following conclusions, among others:
(1) The use of videotape in the courtroom does not signifi-
cantly affect juror verdicts.
(2) The use of videotape in the courtroom does not signifi-
cantly affect the monetary awards to plaintiffs made by jurors.
(3) The use of videotape significantly affects the amount of
trial-related information retained by jurors during a trial, with jurors
retaining more information from taped testimony, particularly when
it is presented monochromatically.
(7) The use of videotape in the courtroom to prevent witness
testimony does not significantly affect juror judgments of the veraci-
ty of the testimony presented.
(9) Within the province of the simple production techniques
studied in this research, characteristics of the witness appear to exert
more impact on juror response than do production decisions. Stated
differently, the presentation skills of the witness are more important
than variations in such factors as a number of cameras and types of
shots given the relatively rudimentary techniques studied."5
Although additional study of the impact of video technology on
the fact-finding process, especially in the context of the AJT format,
is undoubtedly warranted, 5' the work of Miller and Fontes provides
firm ground for believing that a trial process characterized by exten-
sive reliance on videotape can, with proper oversight, regularly pro-
duce accurate verdicts.
5 2
148. See MILLER & FONTES, supra note 145, at 61.
149. See id. at 52 (Table 2.1).
150. See id at 211-12.
151. See infra text accompanying notes 168, 186-87.
152. MnL1R & FoNTEs, supra note 145, at 207-17. But see Marcus, supra note 17, at
762-63 (coming to the opposite conclusion). In a thorough analysis of the issue, Professor
Marcus argues that live trials "convey a texture and intensity" that cannot be matched by the
presentation of videotaped evidence; the latter "would often lack significant emotive elements"
of the former. d at 762-63. He supports this argument by reference to the fact that "movies
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Thus an essential element of an AJT would be the courtroom
presentation of portions of videotaped depositions. To accommodate
this, the rules governing discovery would require modification. In
addition to all of the usual methods of discovery, the rules for AJTs
would authorize parties to videotape "trial depositions," which would
be depositions specifically tailored to create and preserve witnesses'
testimony for courtroom use." Trial depositions would begin with a
direct examination conducted by the proponent of the witness's testi-
mony, followed by cross-examination by the opponent. Simple rules
regarding camera angles and shots would prevent parties from deviat-
ing from a straightforward recording of a deponent's testimony.' In
addition, as is the case with discovery depositions, the traditional
rules of evidence would be in force. 56 Parties could make evidentia-
and television are not the same as legitimate theater." ld at 763.
Having made almost the identical argument in print myself, I obviously have a great
deal of sympathy for Marcus' point of view. Seigel, supra note 13, at 1042-43 & n.203. But,
after reflection, I have concluded that the difference between live testimony and videotape,
though undeniable, is not sufficiently great to forgo the enormous efficiency gains that are
made possible by using videotape in an abbreviated trial procedure.
153. The AJT format would have little impact on the discovery process or pre-trial pro-
cedures generally. It is therefore compatible with either a hands-off attitude toward judicial
intervention in the pre-trial management of cases or with active judicial involvement. The
trend, of course, has been in the latter direction, especially in connection with complex litiga-
tion. See, e.g., Edward F. Sherman, Restructuring the Trial Process in the Age of Complex
Litigation, 63 TEX. L. REV. 721 (1984) (reviewing WILLIAM W. SCHWARZER, MANAGING
ANTrmusT AND OTHER COMPLEX LTGATION: A HANDBOOK FOR LAWYERS AND JUDGES
(1982) and WAYNE D. BRAZiL ET AL, MANAGING COMPLEX LmGATION: A PRACTICAL
GUIDE TO THE USE OF SPECIAL MASTRS (1983)). The AJT could also be coupled with
innovative proposals regarding the pre-trial stage of litigation, such as a fast-track alternative
with accelerated procedures. See McMillan & Siegel, supra note 15, at 438-54.
154. Many jurisdictions already provide for the videotaping of depositions, at least in
some circumstances. See, e.g., FED. R. CIv. P. 30(b)(2) (permitting "sound-and-visual" record-
ing). Some courts have required it in specific cases. See, e.g., Rice's Toyota World, Inc. v.
Southeast Toyota Distrib., Inc., 114 F.R.D. 647 (M.D.N.C. 1987) (granting plaintiff's request
that all depositions be videotaped). The key here is that, for AJTs, the videotaping of trial
depositions would be routine.
Professor Marcus criticizes the widespread imposition of videotaped depositions on cost
grounds. See Marcus, supra note 17, at 748, 775. The only source he relies upon for this
point is Michael H. Graham, Nonstenographic Recording of Depositions: The Empty Promise
of Federal Rule 30(b)(4), 72 Nw. U. L. REV. 566 (1977). Given the revolution in video
technology since 1977, Professor Graham's article seems hopelessly out of date. In my opin-
ion, the reason why depositions are not routinely videotaped today is not the added cost
involved, but the fact that videotaped depositions are generally not admissible at trial. If
AJTs were otherwise perceived as an attractive dispute resolution technique, I do not believe
that the cost of videotaping depositions would stand in their way.
155. See MILLER & FONTrEs, supra note 145, at 214.
156. See FED. R. Civ. P. 30(c) ("Examination and cross-examination of witnesses may
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ry objections to their opponent's questions of the witness. These
objections would preserve the record, but--except when issues of
privilege were implicated-the questions would be answered.'57 Lat-
er, if an objectionable portion of the testimony were included in the
opponent's "trial plan,"'58 the complaining party could ask for a rul-
ing from the court.
In addition to the direct task of creating testimonial evidence for
re-play at trial, trial depositions would represent the record upon
which a party's entire AJT presentation would be based. As discussed
below, counsel would be permitted to take a number of shortcuts
during an AJT; for instance, counsel could proffer facts to authenti-
cate a document.'59 But, absent stipulations, all of the information
proffered at an AJT would have to be based upon evidence estab-
lished by admissible means prior to trial."W Most of this would be
evidence created through the trial deposition process. Thus, trial depo-
sitions would need to be quite thorough.
Responsibility for arranging a trial deposition would rest with the
proponent of the evidence. In many cases, this would probably re-
proceed as permitted at the trial under the provisions of the Federal Rules of Evidence except
Rules 103 and 615. The officer before whom the deposition is to be taken shall put the
witness on oath. ... )
It ought to be noted that, despite this language, the typical discovery deposition is
quite different from trial testimony. In most depositions, cross-examination comes first and
direct examination, if there is any, is used to clear up matters, not make a comprehensive
record. This is one reason that "trial depositions" would require explicit recognition in the
setting of AJTs.
The one traditional rule of evidence concerning witness testimony that might be loos-
ened or eliminated for trial depositions is the prohibition of narrative testimony. See ROGER
C. PARK, TRtAL OBJECrsONs HANDBOOK § 6.14 (1991). Allowing narrative testimony would
enable witnesses, especially parties, to "tell their story" to the jury, which fits the spirit of
the AJT format. This modification could be accomplished at a negligible cost because objec-
tionable material could be edited out of trial depositions prior to their use in the courtroom.
See infra text accompanying note 174.
157. This is comparable to the procedures presently governing discovery depositions under
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:
All objections made at the time of the examination to the qualifications of the
officer taking the deposition, to the manner of taking it, to the evidence presented,
to the conduct of any party, or to any other aspect of the proceedings shall be
noted by the officer upon the record of the deposition; but the examination shall
proceed, with the testimony being taken subject to the objections.
FED. R. CIr. P. 30(c); see also FED. R. EVtv. 1101(c) (noting that the privilege rule applies
at all stages of a case).
158. See infra text accompanying notes 174-77.
159. See infra text accompanying note 168.
160. See infra text accompanying note 169.
1994]
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW
quire deposing the witness for a second time.61 On occasion, how-
ever, parties might agree to economize on trial preparation by com-
bining a witness's discovery and trial depositions. The critical deter-
mination would be whether the case was sufficiently simple, or the
discovery process sufficiently far along, for both parties to feel com-
fortable conducting trial-like examinations of the witness.
The mere replaying of witness depositions at trial, though likely
to improve efficiency to some degree, would certainly not justify
cutting the length of a trial in half.6 6 To achieve such a revolution-
ary change, courtroom presentations during an AJT would need to be
as efficient as television documentaries or business presentations. This
could be accomplished only by permitting attorneys to make complete
and uninterrupted presentations to the jury. Moreover, the benefits of
such a format would be maximized only if the attorneys' presenta-
tions interspersed the three types of information that, in the conven-
tional jury trial, are presented to the jury in isolated steps: introducto-
ry remarks (presently limited to the opening statement); evidence
(presently the body of the case); and argument (presently not permit-
ted until closing argument). This would enable each lawyer to tell his
client's story directly, supporting that story with evidence as it un-
folded." Pre-planned, unified, and coherent presentations by the
parties would also facilitate juror comprehension of a case presented
161. This would, of course, require amendment of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
30(a)(2)(B), which requires leave of court to depose a witness more than once.
162. There is good reason to believe that, as trial lawyers became comfortable with the
AJT, they would link discovery and trial depositions together, thereby minimizing any addi-
tional pre-trial time necessary for AJT preparation. First, the rules governing discovery and
trial depositions would be identical; the unique characteristics of the discovery deposition are
simply the result of pre-trial strategy, which would be quite different in the context of the
AJT. In addition, parties would have a strong incentive to minimize the cost of trial deposi-
tions by linking them with the process of discovery.
To the extent that a second round of depositions were necessary, the pre-trial process
for an AJT would, of course, be longer (and more costly) than that for conventional trials.
But much of this additional time and expense would be recovered as a result of the signifi-
cantly shorter trial. In addition, the time and cost would be shifted from the courts to the
private litigants.
163. In my opinion, the main reason that previous calls for the use of videotape as a
means of streamlining the conventional trial process, see, e.g., McCrystal & Maschari, supra
note 145, at 241-44, have gone unheeded, see Marcus, supra note 17, at 746, is because
participants in the trial process accurately perceived that the efficiency gains from this change
alone would be too small to justify the (mostly non-monetary) costs incurred along the way.
164. The AT format is thus consistent with the recent scholarship delineating a "story
model" of juror decision-making behavior. See, e.g., Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, A
Cognitive Theory of Juror Decision Making: The Story Model, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 519
(1991).
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in a much reduced period of time.
Accordingly, although most of the rules of evidence that govern
conventional jury trials would be equally applicable to AJTs, some
would require significant alteration. First, AJTs would necessitate a
change in the conventional ordering of proof. Something similar to
traditional opening statements might be retained so that the jury
would learn, at the outset of the case, the position of each side. Fol-
lowing this, however, plaintiff would present her case uninterrupted.
Counsel for plaintiff would introduce the first witness and play rele-
vant excerpts from the witness's videotaped trial deposition. Plaintiff
could choose to play excerpts of the cross-examination of the witness,
but she would not be required to do so. After the videotape of the
witness's testimony was complete, plaintiff's counsel might want to
explain to the jury the significance of the testimony-in other words,
to make a short argument. Following this, plaintiff's counsel would
introduce the next piece of evidence, be it excerpts from another
videotape or a document or some other form of physical evidence. At
the close of her case, plaintiff would have the opportunity to make a
brief summary argument. It would then be time for the defendant's
presentation, followed by plaintiffs rebuttal, if any, and the judge's
charge to the jury.
With the current trial paradigm so firmly entrenched in our psy-
ches, it is hard for us to conceive of a system in which a witness's
cross-examination would be separated in time from his direct testimo-
ny. But a process incorporating this separation could function very
well. Let us assume that part of a defendant's case rested on the
argument that plaintiff's two main witnesses are liars. This would
simply become a segment in defendant's story about the case. 65
Likewise, plaintiff could anticipate defendant's witnesses and put on a
segment about the inaccuracy or untruthfulness of their anticipated
testimony in his case-in-chief, or he could save this segment for
rebuttal."
165. Defense counsel might start off his presentation by saying:
Members of the jury. Our witnesses are going to tell you what really happened.
Why did plaintiff's witnesses tell you something different? It's because they lied.
After I show you what the truth is, I'll play for you excerpts from the cross-ex-
amination of plaintiff's witnesses to show you why they were lying.
166. Although a party would not be required to present cross-examination during its
presentation, it would be obliged to make certain that its presentation was not unfair or mis-
leading as a result of being incomplete. If this were the case, the opposing party could ob-
ject to the presentation under Federal Rule of Evidence 106 or the more general notion of
"completeness." Presumably, most such objections would occur pre-trial in reaction to an
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The hearsay rule would also require modification for AJTs. Most
obviously, a videotaped deposition would be admissible during an
AJT in lieu of live testimony, regardless of the availability of the
declarant. 167 But this would not be the most significant change. For
AJTs to be characterized by truly efficient and effective presentations
of information to the jury, attorneys would need the ability to proffer
directly two general types of evidence. First, in introducing a
witness's videotaped testimony, an attorney would be permitted to
provide some background facts, thereby enabling him to confine the
actual video presentation to the heart of the matter. Second, attorneys
would be authorized to proffer the facts surrounding the authentication
of documents and other physical evidence, meaning that physical
evidence would be admissible during an AJT without any testimony
at all. 68
Several rules would be needed to prevent attorneys from proffer-
ing inaccurate or untruthful evidence. Absent a stipulation, an attorney
would be empowered to proffer evidence only if it was contained in
the pre-trial record, i.e., in a videotaped deposition or other admissi-
ble evidence. If one side sought to make reference to facts not con-
tained in the record, the other side would have a valid basis for ob-
jection and, if necessary, for having the proffer stricken. 16  In addi-
tion, prior to an AJT, the attorneys might be required to swear that
all of the information that they intended to proffer, as indicated in
opponent's "trial plan." See infra text accompanying notes 171-176.
167. At present, depositions may be used by any party if the witness is unavailable. FED.
R. EViD. 804 (a), (b)(1); FED. R. CIV. P. 32(a)(3). Interestingly, Federal Rule of Civil Pro-
cedure 32(a)(3)(B) permits the use of a deposition in lieu of live testimony if a witness is
located more than one hundred miles from the place of the trial or hearing. This provision
appears to be a nullity in the face of Federal Rules of Evidence 803 and 804, which fail to
contain a corresponding exception to the hearsay rule.
168. It might make sense to permit attorneys to show pictures (slides, perhaps, or still
video shots) of witnesses whose testimony they are replacing by proffer in order to bring the
AT presentation to life.
With the help of Professor Marcus, my research uncovered one case in which the
parties agreed to a process resembling an AJT. The lawyers for the winning side were so
pleased with the innovative procedures that they published an article describing their experi-
ence. See C. Michael Buxton & Michael Glover, Managing a Big Case Down to Size, LITI-
GATION, Summer 1989, at 22-25. The case involved a complex antitrust claim alleging a ten
year conspiracy; discovery consisted of 300 depositions and 4 million pages of documents. Id
at 22. Through the use of AJT-like techniques, a trial that probably would have lasted the
better part of a year was submitted to the jury in just eight weeks. l
169. To facilitate judicial control over matters of this sort, parties would be required to
annotate their trial plan, see infra text accompanying note 171, with the location of all prof-
fered evidence.
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their trial plan, was supported by the pre-trial record. Attorneys who
breached this sworn statement would be subject to contempt of court
proceedings and an ethics investigation. Finally, a rule could be creat-
ed permitting a motion for a new abbreviated trial on the grounds
that opposing counsel's presentation was not faithful to the underlying
record in some significant and prejudicial way.
Yet another change in evidentiary rules governing AJTs would
concern the issue of relevance. For an AJT, the basic rules of rele-
vance, such as Federal Rules of Evidence 401 and 402, could be
suspended. The time-limited format would provide the lawyers with
sufficient incentive to avoid the presentation of unnecessary evidence.
If a party were foolish enough to present irrelevant evidence, he
would automatically bear the cost-because he would be wasting his
own precious time. Of course, a rule against the introduction of undu-
ly prejudicial evidence, such as Federal Rule of Evidence 403, would
still be required.
One additional alteration of present procedures would be required
to bring the AJT to life. One of the major benefits of live trials is
the ability of each adversary to respond to the evidentiary presenta-
tion of her opponent. Dependent upon the presentation of pre-recorded
testimony, and operating with severe time constraints, AJTs would be
robbed of this spontaneous adversarial clash. Parties would find it
necessary to select the excerpts of videotaped depositions, and to
fashion the arguments surrounding them, in advance. Without atten-
tion, the pre-planned nature of the AJT could cause the parties' court-
room presentations to amount to "ships passing in the night." In other
words, if the parties were left in the dark regarding their counterpart's
theory of the case, they would on occasion fail to address each
other's main contentions. Accurate fact finding would suffer dramati-
cally as a result.17
This outcome could be avoided by requiring the parties to ex-
change (and to file with the court) "trial plans" shortly before the
start of an AJT.171 A trial plan would be a detailed account of the
170. I believe that the failure to tackle this issue is another significant reason why
McCrystal and Maschari's call for pre-recorded videotaped trials has largely been ignored by
courts and scholars alike. See supra notes 145, 163.
171. At least in notorious cases, the trial plans might be filed under seal to prevent the
case from being literally "tried in the press." Cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 30(f) (providing that dis-
covery depositions be sealed and filed with the court). At some point, however, the trial
plans, and the attached exhibits (including the videotapes) would be unsealed---even in cases
that settled prior to the AJT---unless one of the parties objected and could demonstrate good
1994]
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW
party's intended presentation before the jury. It would include, in the
correct order: (1) summaries of the party's arguments; (2) precise
references to the portions of videotape testimony the party anticipated
playing for the jury; (3) outlines of attorney proffers of authenticating
facts and other information; and (4) documents and other physical
evidence the party intended to offer at trial.
The precision and scope of the trial plan cannot be overempha-
sized.' The exchange of plans would be, in effect, the doomsday
event now represented by trial. Since all of the testimony and evi-
dence would already be in existence, it would leave nothing to
chance. There would also be no work product protection at this stage
of the litigation. The attorney would be required to reveal, through
the summaries of her argument, her theory of the case.173 Moreover,
in order to provide the opposition with adequate notice of the con-
tours of her case, counsel's trial plan could be neither underinclusive
nor overinclusive. The prohibition against overinclusiveness would be
necessary to prevent parties from camouflaging their real case in a
mountain of evidence.
Enforcement of the thoroughness of a party's plan would be
simple. During the AJT, each party would be prohibited from offering
evidence not indicated in his trial plan. Upon objection, the judge
would merely have to check her copy of the plan to see if the prof-
fered evidence or argument was admissible. A bit trickier-but far
from impossible-would be enforcement of the requirement that the
trial plan not be overinclusive. This could be policed by having each
cause to keep the plans under seal. In this manner, AJTs would counter some of the prob-
lems associated with secret settlements. See supra text accompanying notes 196-97.
172. The trial plan described in the text is not that much more burdensome than the pre-
trial submissions required today by many courts in connection with full blown jury trials. See
FED. R. CIV. P. 16(f) (governing pre-trial conferences and submissions); see also Marcus,
supra note 17, at 744 ("Active courts commonly require elaborate pretrial submissions from
the parties, often including lists of uncontroverted and controverted facts, summaries of the
direct testimony of witnesses, and premarking of all exhibits. ... ); Charles R. Richey, A
Modem Management Technique For Trial Courts to Improve the Quality of Justice: Requiring
Direct Testimony to be Submitted in Written Form Prior to Trial, 72 GEO. LJ. 73, 85-88
(1983) (setting forth sample order requiring parties to file comprehensive pre-trial briefs which
would specify, inter alia, all legal claims and the evidence to support them, proposed find-
ings of facts and conclusions of law, stipulations, hypothetical questions of expert witnesses,
and a description of all exhibits).
173. Cf. In re San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litig. v. Plaintiff's Steering Comm.,
859 F.2d 1007 (lst Cir. 1988) (discussing at length the relationship between a court's author-
ity to manage litigation under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 16 and 26 and parties' work
product protection and holding, inter alia, that the latter does not preclude the former).
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party include in his plan estimates of the duration of the various
segments of his presentation, the aggregate of which could not exceed
his total time allotment.
In addition to ensuring an adversarial clash, the exchange of
plans could also facilitate pre-trial consideration of all of the major
evidentiary issues in the case. This would be accomplished by the
enactment of a rule requiring the parties to file objections to the
content of each other's plan shortly after the exchange. 74 The trial
judge would rule on these objections prior to trial by reviewing the
necessary videotaped testimony and exhibits in chambers, at her con-
venience.
To preclude parties from loading their trial plans with objection-
able evidence so as to confound an opponent, parties could be prohib-
ited from substituting new evidence for any evidence contained in a
trial plan subsequently ruled inadmissible by the court. In light of the
time restricted format of the AJT and the rule that a trial plan not be
overinclusive, this prohibition would mean that including potentially
objectionable evidence in a trial plan would be a very risky proposi-
tion. If the court were to strike this evidence, the party would pay the
high price of forfeiting the time that the stricken evidence would have
consumed at trial. 75
After the court ruled on all of the pre-trial motions and objec-
tions, and just prior to trial, the parties would exchange and file
"rebuttal plans." For the defendant, this would indicate any changes
174. One would expect a great number of cases to settle around this period of time. The
exchange of trial plans would lay the litigants' cards on the table; if one side's case amount-
ed to a bluff, it would be painfully apparent upon review of that party's trial plan.
Indeed, the AT format could be combined with court-annexed arbitration at this point
very effectively. Parties could be encouraged (or required) to present their abbreviated case to
an arbitrator prior to bringing it into the courtroom for presentation to a jury. They would
have little incentive to forgo such an opportunity, for it would represent a "dress rehearsal"
of the upcoming trial. As a result, even more cases would settle prior to the use of any
court time. Although settlement has its drawbacks, see infra text accompanying notes 188-
200, any realistic system of efficient dispute resolution is going to require a high settlement
rate. See supra note 128.
175. In some circumstances, an exception to this rule might be required in the interests
of fairness. For example, a party might choose an expert whose testimony is objected to and
later stricken under Federal Rule of Evidence 702. The court might give the proponent of the
stricken testimony the chance to depose another expert and substitute that expert's testimony
in the trial plan prior to an AT. In addition, parties might seek to avoid the harshness of
this rule by requesting the court to rule in limine on the admissibility of specific evidence. In
the context of the AT, in limine would mean prior to the filing of the trial plans. Of
course, judges could decline to make such in limine rulings, forcing trial counsel to decide
whether to risk including the evidence in the trial plan or not.
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he sought to make to his original plan in light of his review of the
plaintiff's trial plan. For the plaintiff, it would indicate any changes
and also outline the arguments and evidence he intended to present
during his rebuttal case, if any. Objections to these plans would prob-
ably have to wait until the AJT was underway.
176
3. Acceptable Verdicts
AJTs would be a failure if they were to yield verdicts unaccept-
able to the parties and the general public. 7 Acceptability of ver-
dicts is, of course, closely related to verdict accuracy.77 But this
relationship is necessarily a complex one; only those who know
"what really happened" can assess verdict accuracy directly and, even
then, their assessment will be colored by their subjective perceptions
of reality. Accordingly, it is much more likely that the acceptability
of AJT verdicts would be judged on the basis of whether participants
in the process, as well as observers, came to believe that AJTs were
fair. To some extent, this would be measured by the same yardstick
used to measure verdict accuracy: a determination of whether the
AJT's safeguards against tainted evidence and improper argument
were adequate.Y7 9 But success of the AJT would also require the le-
gal community, and ultimately the public, to become comfortable with
the very idea of a time-limited, multi-media trial. It is this latter point
that is addressed here.180
Given the strength of our current trial paradigm, it is understand-
ably difficult to conceive of living in a world in which lawyers
would be responsible for fitting the presentation of their cases into
fixed periods of time. Visions of disaster dance through our heads:
individuals running around the courtroom to save time;'8' lawyers
176. Even with the provisions concerning the exchange of trial plans, I cannot argue with
Professor Marcus's conclusion that trial by videotape will "fall short of the live trial, in
terms of interaction, since there is no chance for on-the-spot questioning of the witness."
Marcus, supra note 17, at 769. However this fact is not a strong indictment of the AJT
procedure. The AJT would not eliminate the spontaneous questioning of witnesses, it would
simply move this spontaneity one step back-to the trial deposition. Spontaneous interchanges
would thus be captured on videotape, available for replay before the jury.
177. The importance to the legal system of generating acceptable verdicts is discussed at
length in Seigel, supra note 13, at 1001-09.
178. See Marcus, supra note 17, at 777 ("The second acceptance factor is perceived
accuracy.").
179. Cf. id. at 776 (noting that "procedures may serve to make the decision acceptable to
the litigants, perhaps even if they are not happy with the outcome" and that parties need to
feel that they have had a fair chance to tell their story).
180. The former issue has already been taken up. See supra part lI.B.2.
181. Of course, this vision is based on present reality. See McKnight v. General Motors
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being cut off in mid-sentence; judges dismissing cases because a party
did not have sufficient time to make out a prima facie case."8 2 How
could the output of a system characterized by events of this sort ever
produce acceptable results?'
Part of the answer to this question rests on the conviction that
these events would be very rare-and would probably constitute at-
torney malpractice. If a lawyer knew in advance that she had a fixed
length of time to prove her case, and if the rules of evidence permit-
ted her to estimate accurately the length of her courtroom presenta-
tion, the lawyer would fit her case into the time provided. There is a
simple reason for this: lawyers want to win their cases. They would
not win AJTs by running around the courtroom or by being so sloppy
in their pre-trial preparation that they failed to present fundamental
facts to the jury during their allotted trial time. Given sufficient in-
centive, humans consistently demonstrate a remarkable ability to adapt
to new conditions.184
Acceptance of AJTs would also require participants in the pro-
cess and the public at large to shift "due process" paradigms in con-
Corp., 908 F.2d 104, 115 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 919 (1991) (describing that
"witnesses ran to and from the stand in a desperate effort to complete their testimony be-
fore" the amount of time the trial judge had allocated to each side expired).
182. We have already witnessed the dismissal of a case for insufficient evidence where
the court limited the parties to the testimony of only one witness each. See Secretary of
Labor v. DeSisto, 929 F.2d 789, 794-96 (1st Cir. 1991); supra text accompanying note 130.
183. Cf. Marcus, supra note 17, at 787 (worrying that strict time limits risk "siphoning
off so much meat of the case that what remains for the trial is merely the husk, and not the
heart of the dispute").
184. McKnight, 908 F.2d at 104, and DeSisto, 929 F.2d at 789, do not disprove this
point. Currently, courts are imposing time and proof constraints on lawyers on an arbitrary
and ad hoc basis. Lawyers are not mentally prepared to assume the burden of a time-limited
presentation; moreover, the rules of procedure and evidence have not been amended to facili-
tate a more predictable and streamlined trial. As a result, time-limited trials are not really
being given a fair chance at acceptance and success.
My recent experience as an expert witness provides some insight into this point. I
was hired by plaintiff's counsel in a Section 1983 case involving an alleged false arrest.
Counsel originally estimated that his case-in-chief would take two weeks to present to the
jury. Pre-trial preparation indicated that my direct testimony would consume about two hours
of court time. When the case began, the judge summarily informed counsel for both parties
that they would have a total of one week to try the case. It was much too late for either
side to pare down its case in any thoughtful fashion. They simply hurried along as best they
could. For example, without any additional preparation, my direct testimony was reduced to a
half hour. Although counsel tried to cover the high points, I felt that my testimony was
chaotic and confusing. If plaintiff's counsel had known of the time limit in advance, he
could have easily tailored my testimony and the rest of his case to fit that limit without
jeopardizing the effectiveness of his presentation.
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nection with the system of civil justice. At present, the system is
founded on the notion that judges are responsible for providing the
parties with as much time as they need to prove their case. Under
this paradigm, judicially imposed time limits, though not unheard of,
are necessarily flexible." But there are a great many processes in
life that are thought to produce fair outcomes despite inflexible time
limits. Consider, for example, law school examinations. Most law pro-
fessors give exams that require students to work under tremendous
time pressure. Despite this constraint, professors believe that their
exams provide a fair measure of students' abilities. Moreover, with
the exception of the disabled, professors do not feel responsible for
making individual adjustments to ensure that each student has a fair
opportunity to demonstrate his or her abilities on the examination.
Quite the contrary; if a student were to ask for more time, the profes-
sor would deny the request. The burden to meet the time limit is
strictly on the students.
An example of this phenomenon can also be found in law prac-
tice. Appellate briefs are uniformly page-limited and appellate argu-
ment is extraordinarily brief. Despite this, one rarely hears a lawyer
complaining, "If I only had five more pages (or ten more minutes) I
would have won that case." Rather, it is a generally accepted part of
the process that the lawyer must pick and choose among a multitude
of facts and legal theories in order to make the most persuasive pre-
sentation, given the page and time constraints.
A loose analogy can also be made to sporting events. At present,
trials are conducted like the game of baseball; there is no clock, only
a set of rules. Like judges, baseball umpires might try to hurry the
game up (they might show their impatience when a manager takes
too long to discuss a situation with his pitcher, for instance), but they
have very little effect on the game's duration. In any event, we ac-
cept as fair the judgment that the team with more runs at the end of
nine innings (or more in the event of a tie) is the winner.
Many other sporting events, such as football games, are con-
trolled by the clock. Regarding these games, we accept as fair the
outcome after the clock has run out. We do not hear fans complain-
185. See McKnight, 908 F.2d at 115 (disapproving of the imposition of arbitrary and in-
flexible time limits); Flaminio v. Honda Motor Co., 733 F.2d 463, 473 (7th Cir. 1984) (dis-
approving of "rigid" hour limits on a trial); SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 77 F.R.D. 10, 15-16
(D, Conn. 1977) (imposing limits, but noting the possibility of more time for plaintiff's case
if absolutely necessary).
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ing that they were cheated because, if the clock had run five more
minutes, their team would have won. Rather, fans blame their team
for not winning the game in the allotted period of time.
There is no inherent reason why we could not change our view
of trials and think of them as time-limited, just like football games.
Indeed, the same can be said for the game- of baseball. The impo-
sition of time limits on baseball games would initially strike us, of
course, as odd and potentially unfair. ("What do you mean my team
would lose if it were down by a run in the bottom of the ninth with
no outs and the bases loaded ...because the clock ran out?") But
after a while we would expect baseball players to adjust their play to
take the clock into account and, of course, they would. The only
difference between trials and baseball is the fact that, as to the latter,
there is no good reason to superimpose a clock on the game. In the
case of trials, there is.
The use of videotape as an integral part of the AT appears to
be less worrisome on acceptability grounds than the time-limited
format. Videotape is currently used in trials in a variety of ways,
including to present the testimony of unavailable witnesses.'86 Addi-
tionally, more and more trials are themselves being recorded or
broadcast live to television viewers in their own homes.' The main
threat to the acceptability of multi-media AJTs would no doubt arise
from the possibility that some lawyers might get so comfortable with
the abbreviated format that their presentations would take on the feel
of slick, professional docudramas. Simple rules placing constraints on
the process, however, such as the prohibition of fancy editing tech-
niques, would probably suffice in preventing this problem from get-
ting out of hand.
186. See FED. R. Civ. P. 30(b) (authorizing videotape recording of depositions); FED. R.
Civ. P. 32(c) (authorizing use of a videotaped deposition at trial if the witness is unavail-
able); FED. R. EVID. 804(a) (defining unavailability for purposes of the hearsay rule); FED. R.
EVID. 804(b)(1) (setting out the hearsay exception for former testimony, including deposi-
tions).
187. The major developments in the area include the advent of Court TV, which is
largely devoted to the broadcasting of live court proceedings, and the Cable News Network
("CNN"), which occasionally broadcasts portions of high publicity trials. See David A. Harris,
The Appearance of Justice: Court TV, Conventional Television, and Public Understanding of
the Criminal Justice System, 35 ARmZ. L. REv. 785, 797-807 (1993) (describing the history
and objectives of Court TV); Robert J. Hawkins, O.J. Case 'Breaking News' on CD-ROM,
SAN DIEGo UNION-TRm., Aug. 25, 1994, at Night & Day 43 (describing Court TV's cover-
age of the OJ. Simpson case and CNN's release of a CD-ROM disc on the same matter).
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4. Adjudication, Not Settlement
The AJT would be a method of adjudication, not settlement. As
such, it would be characterized by: (1) fact-finding; (2) third-party
decision-making; (3) on the record proceedings; and (4) a public
trial." ' The decision to design the AJT as an adjudication is deliber-
ate and, of course, it requires justification.
In many instances, there is nothing wrong with settlement. If
parties assess the outcome of a case similarly, and they voluntarily
choose to avoid the cost and uncertainties of litigation, it is usually in
their best interests, as well as in the interests of society and the adju-
dicatory system, for them to settle their dispute prior to trial." 9 Fur-
thermore, there is generally nothing wrong with pre-trial techniques
designed to facilitate settlement. Such techniques, such as court-an-
nexed arbitration, mediation, Summary Jury Trials, and Mini-Trials,
encourage settlement in two ways. First, they constitute doomsday
events, in the sense that attorneys must prepare for them in a manner
similar to their preparation for trial. As a result, attorneys are in a
position to assess the strengths and weaknesses of their case and to
come to some preliminary conclusions about its value."9 Second,
these settlement techniques provide the attorneys, as well as the liti-
gants, with a third-party's assessment of the case. This information
can be the starting point for settlement negotiations. 9'
Some methods of facilitating settlement, however, are not so
benign. Judicial arm-twisting, which is becoming an ever more com-
mon event, is extremely problematic."9 As Judith Resnik has point-
ed out, managerial judging means a substantial increase in the number
188. See Landsman, supra note 143, at 490.
The central precept of adversary process is that out of the sharp clash of proofs
presented by adversaries in a forensic setting, is most likely to come the informa-
tion upon which a neutral and passive decision maker can base the resolution of a
litigated dispute acceptable to both the parties and society.
Id.; see also Resnik, Adjudicatory Decline, supra note 13, at 545 (emphasizing that adjudica-
tion takes place in public, so that "government-empowered individuals . . . have some ac-
countability both to the immediate recipients of the decisions and to the public at large").
189. See Alschuler, supra note 13, at 1821 ("So long as civil settlement represents a
reasonably knowing, reasonably voluntary allocation of resources by the parties most affected
by this allocation, it is preferable to litigation.").
190. See Kaufman, supra note 7, at 15, 20.
191. ld. at 14, 20.
192. Indeed, it was once thought inappropriate for judges to be involved in settlement
negotiations at all. Now, the rules of civil procedure expressly provide for a judicial role in
the process. See Galanter, Judicial Mediation, supra note 18, at 1-2; Resnik, Managerial
Judges, supra note 4, at 380-85.
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of informal, off-the-record, non-public contacts between judges and
parties. This raises the possibility, and inevitably the reality, of the
abuse of judicial power. For instance, during these contacts the judge
learns many of the facts about the case informally, which is a source
of potential prejudice if the case goes to trial. More importantly,
when the judge expresses his opinion of the case-which he may
need to do to spur a settlement-the parties are automatically caught
in a dilemma. If they resist settlement, they run the risk of having a
hostile judge who is convinced that they are wasting his time preside
at trial. On the other hand, they may sincerely disagree with the
judge's evaluation of the case.'93
It is not simply the specter of judicial impropriety that makes
settlement a sometimes problematic event for the litigants. Parties can
be coerced to settle as a result of factors unrelated to the merits of
their claim or defense. In some instances, a party might settle a case
for much less than it is worth because he cannot afford, either finan-
cially or psychologically, or both, to await his day in court. The cost
of litigation can also force a litigant of relatively modest means to
settle, especially if he faces a giant who can afford to use pre-trial
processes as an opportunity for the "strategic infliction of waste."'94
Settlement can also be contrary to the public interest. In some
cases a litigant settles precisely because he seeks to avoid a public
airing of the dispute.'95 Sometimes, of course, a party legitimately
wishes to protect its privacy. But often, the avoidance of the formal
and public fact finding of a trial is intended to keep the public in the
dark about potential harms caused by a party's activity or prod-
uct.'96 The private disposition of a case is especially deleterious to
other litigants who may remain ignorant about potential discovery
material and even evidence as a result of being unable to make use
193. See Resnik, Managerial Judges, supra note 4, at 407-13; see also Alsehuler, supra
note 13, at 1835-36. But see Flanders, supra note 125, at 507-14 (contending that pre-trial
management of cases does not lead to abuse of judicial power).
194. Alschuler, supra note 13, at 1830; see also id. at 1822-31; Fiss, supra note 18, at
1076-78.
195. See Resnik, Adjudicatory Decline, supra note 13, at 536 (noting that some litigants
"seek shelter in ADR as a means of resolving their disputes safe from public scrutiny").
196. See Laura Macklin, Promoting Settlement, Foregoing the Facts, 14 REv. L. & SOC.
CHANGE 575, 595-99 (1986) (detailing the benefits of judicial fact determination and noting
the openness of the process and its results). Parties typically stipulate to, and judges routinely
approve, protective orders under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c) designed to ensure
that the information obtained through discovery does not become public. See Marcus, supra
note 144, at 9-11.
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW
of work done and information gathered by their predecessors. 97 In
most instances, settlement also circumvents the entry of judgment,
thereby denying future litigants the benefits of collateral estoppel or
res judicata.
Settlement also eliminates the formal resolution of many legal
issues that would have provided guidance for future conduct by indi-
viduals facing similar situations. 9 Indeed, settlement permits parties
to circumvent the law, thereby generally weakening the rule of
law.' In addition, it permits a party to resolve a case without hav-
ing to take any blame; to pay money without having to admit liabili-
ty. If not immoral, this is at best an amoral resolution of the matter.
Finally, in a more general sense, settlement avoids the cathartic and
cleansing function served by well publicized trials. Parties to a dis-
pute are denied their "day in court." Members of the public are de-
nied their chance to learn about, contemplate, and come to terms with
the behavior of their fellow citizens. They are robbed of the opportu-
nity to experience the sense that justice has been served-or a sense
of outrage that it has been denied.' °
For these reasons, the AJT proposal is an attempt to make civil
litigation more efficient not by avoiding adjudication, but by making
197. Litigants might be able to learn the details of prior settlements through discovery.
See Wayne D. Brazil, Protecting the Confidentiality of Settlement Negotiations, 39 HASTINGS
LJ. 955, 987-99 (1988) (discussing arguments and precedents for and against discovery of
settlement information); Kristina M. Kerwin, Note, The Discoverability of Settlement and ADR
Communications: Federal Rule of Evidence 408 and Beyond, 12 REv. LiG. 665 (1993).
198. See Edward Brunet, Questioning the Quality of Alternate Dispute Resolution, 62
TJL. L. REv. 1, 15-31 (1987) (discussing the importance of generating substantive rules from
dispute resolution in order to protect third parties and to provide the public with behavioral
guideposts). A recent and notorious case in which a private settlement resulted in the failure
of important litigation to provide the interested community with much-needed behavioral
norms occurred in connection with the professional regulation of lawyers. In the wake of the
collapse of the Lincoln Savings and Loan Association, the federal government threatened to
bring suit against Kaye Scholer, a well known New York law firm. Many in the profession
watched this case closely, believing that it would be a titanic struggle that would establish
new norms for attorney behavior, particularly vis-a-vis the federal government. Shortly after
the government filed suit, however, the parties reached a settlement. Kaye Scholer agreed to
pay $41 million, $21 million above the limits of their insurance coverage. This was a shock-
ing development to many, but because the case had been settled so quickly, none of the
legal or ethical issues were aired, let alone resolved. See Amy Stevens & Paulette Thomas,
Legal Crisis: How a Big Law Firm Was Brought to Knees By Zealous Regulators, WALL ST.
J., Mar. 13, 1992, at Al.
199. See Harry T. Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema?, 99
HARV. L. REv. 668, 676-79 (1986) (expressing concern that ADR "will replace the rule of
law with nonlegal values").
200. See Seigel, supra note 13, at 1018-21.
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the process of adjudication more efficient. If the AJT were successful,
more cases would be subject to a public, on-the-record proceeding
through which an impartial entity would declare who was right and
who was wrong.'" Many cases would still be settled, of course,
but-because AJTs would also help reduce the backlog of civil cas-
es-fewer disputes would be settled for the wrong reasons. Indeed,
the ultimate normative aspiration ought to be a system in which judg-
es, rather than feeling compelled to push settlement at all costs, feel
free to counsel against or reject an occasional settlement because it is
not in the public interest.'
5. Jury Trials
One scholar who has studied the problem of civil justice delay,
George L. Priest, concluded that the solution lies in constraining the
jurisdiction of the civil jury. °3 Priest's argument proceeds as fol-
lows. Empirical evidence shows that juries decide a huge number of
very routine cases. These cases, which do not implicate complex or
conflicting societal values or difficult political judgments, could be
satisfactorily resolved by a judge. Estimates are that bench trials
would be up to forty percent more efficient than jury trials, so an
increase in bench trials would increase the rate of adjudication and,
due to the increase in doomsdays, the rate of settlement. But the use
of bench trials would have an even greater effect on the pace of civil
litigation because judges act more predictably than juries. Thus, some
cases that go to trial under the jury system would settle in the face of
a bench trial because parties do not waste money litigating cases
when they agree on the probable outcome.'
Priest's empirical observations are probably correct. Nevertheless,
as its name makes clear, the Abbreviated Jury Trial would retain a
commitment to the use of juries in civil cases. The rejection of
Priest's recommendation arises out of a profound disagreement with
his normative conclusion that juries are an unnecessary burden in
201. Professor Marcus fears that, even if public, some summary processes might be so
cryptic that they would "undermine the values protected by the public's right of access."
Marcus, supra note 17, at 779. He makes the valid point that, if the public cannot under-
stand summary proceedings, it cannot evaluate the outcomes produced by them. Id. This
problem would not plague AJTs because they would be sufficiently detailed and textured to
communicate all important aspects of a dispute to any interested observer.
202. At present, judges are empowered to reject settlements only in the context of class
action suits. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e).
203. Priest, Role of the Jury, supra note 13, at 191-200.
204. Id.
1994]
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routine civil cases. Many others have examined the institution of the
jury in great detail and have debated the costs and benefits thought to
accrue from its use; these issues need not be repeated here.' At
bottom, the AJT is based on the belief that trial by jury is the only
process that offers at least the hope of protecting citizens against
biases that are inevitable in a system of civil justice.'
The behavior of litigants indicates agreement with this claim. At
present, parties can voluntarily choose to try their case before a judge
or, through arbitration, in front of a panel of experts. Some do, but
many others opt for a jury trial. It is difficult to believe that parties
submit to trial by jury because they think that it will be more effi-
cient or result in a more accurate outcome than the alternatives. Rath-
205. Some scholars appear to agree with Priest that the jury is an institution hardly
worth saving. See e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, The Vanishing Civil Jury, 1990 U. CHI. LEGAL
F. 1, 24 (holding out the possibility of jury trials but concluding: "As the civil jury and the
civil trial approach the vanishing point, we must again find impartial decisionmakers who will
listen."). Others are more non-committal. See Paul D. Carrington, The Seventh Amendment:
Some Bicentennial Reflections, 1990 U. CHi. LEGAL F. 33, 86 (concluding that the history of
the civil jury is one of "the declining effectiveness of an esteemed institution"); Stephen C.
Yeazell, The New Jury and the Ancient Jury Conflict, 1990 U. CI. LEGAL F. 87, 117
("Both those who argue for an extension of [the jury's] egalitarian sway and those who view
it as an unjustifiably irrational relic have strong arguments."). Many scholars, however, have
forcefully defended the institution of the jury. See Ronald J. Allen, Factual Ambiguity and a
Theory of Evidence, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 604, 632 n.87 (1994) (arguing that jurors are better
fact finders than judges because the fact-finding process is one of induction: "those '12
persons' are a tremendous reservoir of knowledge, learned over their entire lives, who perhaps
possess sufficient humility to actually listen to the stories [told by the parties] without pre-
judging the outcome"); Ronald J. Allen, Unexplored Aspects of the Right to Trial by Jury, 66
WASH. U. L.Q. 33, 35 (1988) (noting the importance of the jury as a democratic institution);
Peter W. Culley, In Defense of Civil Juries, 35 ME. L. REV. 17, 17 (1983) ("Mhe [a]uthor
believes strongly that the civil jury has continuing vitality and that many commonly held
beliefs about shortcomings of the jury system are not justified."); Marc Galanter, The Civil
Jury as a Regulator of the Litigation Process, 1990 U. CI. LEGAL F. 201, 257 (concluding,
after a comprehensive look at the role of civil juries, that the litigation system ought to be
improved "by refining and enlarging the use of the civil jury, not by eliminating it"); Harry
Kalven, Jr., The Dignity of the Civil Jury, 50 VA. L. REV. 1055, 1065-66 (1964) (setting
forth empirical data indicating that jury verdicts are consistent with the judge's view of the
appropriate outcome in seventy-nine per cent of cases studied, with the difference stemming
from the jury's "sense of equity").
206. But see Roy L. Brooks, A Critical Race Theory Critique of the Right to a Jury
Trial Under Title VII, 5 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 159, 165-68 (1993) (arguing that, under
Critical Race Theory analysis, defendants' right to jury trial in discrimination cases hurts
plaintiffs because the jury is likely to be racist). Brooks notes that
race crits would have to concede that at least some judges are "naturally" racist.
But perhaps critical race theorists are willing to take their chances with a single
decisionmaker who just may be more enlightened than other judges and who, in
any event, has to commit his or her reasoning to writing.
Id. at 167. I am not convinced.
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er, it seems much more plausible that civil litigants who choose a
jury trial do so because they sense that a jury is more likely to be
fair and impartial than a government employee or a group of industry
experts.'
Priest's observation that judges are more predictable than juries
really proves this point. As anyone who has litigated knows, judges
become well known for their built-in biases-for being pro-govern-
ment, pro-business, pro-plaintiff, and so on. It is on the basis of such
biases that a judge's baseline reaction to a set of facts can be pre-
dicted in advance of trial. To the party on the losing side, this "pre-
dictability" feels a lot more like injustice. For all of its faults, the
jury system minimizes (though it does not eliminate) the possibility
that the adjudicatory system will incorporate wholesale biases against
parties of one kind or another."°
Many cases, of course, can be satisfactorily resolved by means of
a bench trial or arbitration. Given that these techniques are more
efficient than conventional jury trials, and perhaps in some cases
more accurate, they ought to be available to litigants as alternative
forms of dispute resolution.' But fairness dictates that parties to
even the most routine forms of litigation ought to have an ultimate
right to trial by jury.
IV. CONCLUSION
Given that AJTs would mark a radical departure from current
practice, they might, in accordance with the teachings of neopragmatic
methodology, be subject to systematic empirical study prior to their
ubiquitous use in real courtrooms."' A series "laboratory" studies
could compare juror reactions to a simulated case presented in con-
ventional and abbreviated formats. Another series of controlled studies
might be more ambitious, perhaps "referring out" a case to a group
of practicing attorneys. One set of attorneys would be instructed to
prepare the case for a conventional trial; the other set would prepare
for an AJT. Eventually the two types of trials could be held in front
207. See Landsman, supra note 143, at 494 n.26 (noting that the significant number of
litigants who opt for jury trials share a belief in the neutrality of juries).
208. See id. at 493-94 (arguing that juries are the preferred decision makers in an ad-
versary system because it is more likely to be neutral than "the solitary judge whose biases
frequently influence the decisions he renders").
209. This statement reflects pragmatic sensitivity to the fact that different situations may
require different responses. See supra text accompanying note 84.
210. See supra p. 587.
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of different sets of simulated jurors, perhaps with actual trial judges
presiding. Comparison of a number of variables could be made be-
tween the two formats, such as: the number of hours expended in
preparation; the length of the courtroom proceedings; attorney satis-
faction with the procedures; judicial reaction to the abbreviated for-
mat; juror comprehension of the facts; and juror satisfaction with the
process.
In addition, or perhaps in the alternative, AJTs could be em-
ployed in a few real cases on a trial basis by agreement of the par-
ties. Researchers could conduct field studies in connection with these
AJTs, measuring, in addition to other variables, the parties' satisfac-
tion with the procedure. As experience with the abbreviated process
grew, it might be modified to accommodate unanticipated problems.
Ultimately the success of AJTs would be measured by the eagerness
of jurisdictions to add them to their dispute resolution menu.
